The most prominent characteristic of the Egyptian army is that it is not politicized, and the greatest threat it could be exposed to is that of becoming politicized. Indeed, there are no politics in the army, and the army does not engage in political activity. All Egyptians have the right to join political parties and forces, to run as candidates in elections and to vote in referendums, but army (and also police) officers and personnel are forbidden from exercising such a right. The belief also prevails that the corruption of the police for long decades, then its collapse at the start of the Revolution, was due to its politicization and the focus of the security apparatus on performing political tasks for the regime and on keeping the ruling elite secure at the expense of the police's primary function of protecting society. What some of the well-intentioned believe to be the slowness of the Military Council's procedures, while others believe it to be deliberate slowness at taking important decisions or delay at reacting to important events, is perhaps due to the fact that the leaders of the Egyptian army have great and historical military experience that would enable them to wage wars and emerge victorious, but they, like other army leaders and officers, are engaging in politics by obligation after the Revolution with the procedures and the considerations of war. We say this on the occasion of the protest – limited in numbers – that took place in Roxy Square in the suburb of Heliopolis two days ago, in which slogans were raised and chanted in support of the Military Council and in approval of the way it has been managing the transitional period. What should be understood of course is that this protest has come in response to the protests that took place in Tahrir Square and in other Egyptian squares, were protesters demanded that the demands of the Revolution be met and its goals be reached – demands and goals which are well known. It is true that all Egyptians (now) have the right to express their opinion as long as they do this peacefully. And it is only natural for opinions to differ over the performance of the Military Council, its decisions, its statements and the measures it has taken. Yet the Egyptian army in general and the Military Council in particular have no need for the support of those who place them in a position equivalent to that of political forces in society that have demands they insist on having met, resorting sometimes to demonstrations and at other times to protests, or even to some extreme forms of behavior, in order to pressure the Military Council itself or Doctor Essam Sharaf's government for the sake of achieving this. Some political parties or forces may have reservations on the issue of criticizing the Military Council and reject calls to form a civilian Presidential Council that would manage the transitional period in its stead – and those meant here are specifically the Islamists, who stand in opposition to a movement of Liberals, Nasserists and Leftists who have adopted this call. Debate might also take place over the style of the Military Council's performance in managing the transitional period, but this does not at all mean that it is good to call for supporting the Council in the face of those who oppose some of its decisions, have reservations over the measures it has taken, or reject its methods and its procedures. Indeed, the army is managing the transitional period and laying the foundations for some form of post-revolutionary state, in the manner and with the views which it believes to be in the best interest of Egypt, not in the interest of this or that political faction. Its views may agree with those of or its decisions work in favor of a certain faction, but this must not be deliberate or aim to achieve benefits for this or that faction. What is certain is that holding a protest in support of the Military Council suggests and reinforces the belief that some political forces stand alongside it and others against it, while the army should be standing alongside everyone, even if some of its decisions meet with the disapproval of some. Moreover, it is no secret that fears are spreading among the political forces opposed to political Islam of the Islamists dominating and monopolizing rule of the country in the future, and such forces seek by any means, and especially through the media, to reduce the opportunities available to the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, and other factions of the Islamist movement in general, to seize power. Tahrir Square has often witnessed such a debate – one which emerges to the surface every time the Islamists decide to boycott a demonstration or a protest. It is no secret either that the stances taken by the Islamists in general are closest to the views of the Military Council, and in fact that their stances are those most often in defense of “some” of the Council's decisions and most often oppose to the point of rejection every stance demanding the replacement of the Council with a civilian Presidential Council. Nevertheless, this should not be viewed as gratitude towards the military, as it is rather due to the fact that the views held by the Islamists have politically settled on those convictions. Furthermore, it appears quite plainly that some forces are “uncomfortable” with the military for the mere fact that the stances of Islamists are in tune with the decisions taken by the Military Council, and that it could have been the other way around had the Muslim Brotherhood for example not adopted stances close to those of the Council. On the whole, the transitional period will end sooner or later, but it is important for the army to preserve its independence, regardless of objections to its policies during the transitional period, so that it may after this return to its barracks and hand over power to a civilian government that will come from the ballot boxes, not from army garrisons.
