There are many observations that can be made with regard to the two days of meetings held in the Syrian capital, highlighted by the consultative sessions on forming a body to hold national dialogue. Perhaps one might be shocked to notice that the opening sessions coincided with a new campaign of arrests in the city of Homs, which have resulted in many people detained. The question is about the meaning of dialogue at a time when the authorities are relying heavily on the security solution, although (for research purposes, as they say) one may go beyond this and move to what has been discussed at the meetings. If readers want to arrive at conclusions and sum up the speech of the vice-president, Farouq al-Sharaa, one can discern a stepping back from the authorities' earlier tone, and an acknowledgment of the depth of confusion and drift that the regime suffer from, as it tries to take the initiative from the opposition. Perhaps it is not too unjust to say that al-Sharaa's speech did not put forward political ideas; he was content to talk about procedural matters, such as lifting the ban on the return of Syrian opposition members outside the country. Meanwhile, the slogans of "transitioning to a belief that the people are the source of political power, like the rest of the advanced world," were vague. Al-Sharaa's remarks present a sample of what characterized most speakers, including the intellectual al-Tayyib Tizini, whose call to dismantle the security state was welcomed by many. One might ask if Tizini was unaware that this type of call cannot be implemented without the necessary tools, and particularly without a balance of forces in society, forcing the state to dismantle the security agencies that give their name to the "security state." It is no secret to say that dismantling the security state requires settling the conflict between the security agencies and the economic and material interests and social forces that the agencies cling to. Movement in this direction also assumes the existence of an independent judiciary and a free press that can intervene, to monitor and correct any defects that might appear during this process, which will be complicated and long-term, and could also involve bloodshed. This diagnosis of the situation extends to the same meetings, which have taken place without the authorities recognizing a radical change in the street, which would be simply arrogant to dismiss. Hundreds of thousands of people in Hama and other Syrian cities demonstrated, demanding the fall of the regime, and one cannot ignore this, or deal with it as if it did not happen. To say, as al-Sharaa did, that the dialogue "is not a concession by the authorities to the people" will only help spread the conviction among the ranks of the Syrian opposition that the regime has still not learned the lessons that have not stopped coming since mid-March, and that it clings to its version of Salafi emirates, armed gangs, and foreign conspiracies. Perhaps this is the Achilles' heel in the approach by the regime to the crisis that Syria is experiencing: an inability to recognize that forces in the street have been able, after all of the considerable blood and the sacrifices of thousands of those arrested, to gain the trust of a considerable number of Syrians. These young, vital forces, which are aware of the complications of the Syrian position (as proved by the working paper published by the Local Coordination Committees), have proven that they are more capable than many of those who attended the National Dialogue conference at the Sahara resort complex of being a true partner in power. It won't be long before these young forces will be a complete and total "alternative."
