General elections are an occasion for rectifying what took place in past years and announcing the prevailing movement with the popular legitimacy for the coming years. At such a turning point, policies are judged and myths fall apart. This was carried out with great success, despite the fact that the pre-elections performance of the March 14 forces was not at its best, and despite the existence of weapons in parallel with the official weapons that overshadowed the electoral process and were behind threats and uncontrolled betrayal stances. For the elections to take place in the shadow of illegal weapons, and for the party fighting these weapons to win, it is one of the most bizarre features of political life and electoral processes that constitutes an extremely rare exception. Nonetheless, the majority of the Lebanese were able to level down many policies and myths, mythological policies, and political myths. After today, it would be better not to say – in the same light tone used in the past – that the results of the 2005 elections came as “an emotional reaction to the assassination of Rafic Hariri”, without acknowledging any other political and independence-related content to them. It is not appropriate anymore for those who say this to repeat their favorite excuse that these results were brought about by “Ghazi Kanaan's elections law” and that the majority of the previous parliament had resulted from “thievery” provided by the “quadripartite alliance”. In addition to the symbolic meaning of Fouad Saniora's victory in Saida, it has become too trite to consider that most Lebanese only see him as an enemy, or that this majority is angry at his economic policy while it deals with the suspension of economic life with glee. More importantly, most of the Lebanese said that they do not feel comfortable with the weapons of the resistance, and feel nothing but fears and obsessions. They consider that the July 2006 was neither “a divine victory” nor a victory except to the same extent as May 7 was “a glorious day”. This easy discourse mode has deafeningly fallen, and its controversial nature has become obvious, and hence its denominational and minority nature too. The elections have revealed a lot about Christians, whose regions witnessed the fiercest battles. While they previously delegated Michel Aoun as their primary political leader due to their disillusionment and empty leadership positions, they have started today to take back their delegation. This is reflected in the failure of the main figures of Tayyar (Abu Jamra and Bassil) and the Takattul (political bloc) (Skaff), in addition to the serious battles and tight differences in most of the circumscriptions where Aounists won. It is true that Aoun maintained some of his victories, particularly in Kesserwan, but the losses in Beirut I and Zahleh, and the transformation of Zghorta to an exception in the North are no less important issues. This means that the Christians who previously “covered” Hezbollah's weapons have begun to diminish, and with them the pretexts that assure a passing “popularity” to the resistance sects. Also, the traditional and ordinary voice on Lebanon and its role is being restored. Perhaps this is not what is sought by anyone aiming for a democratic, multiple and sectarian society, but this is assuredly better than turning into a launching pad for small rockets and a receiving land for bigger rockets. And yet, the announcement of the majority of Lebanese of their opinion and convictions is one thing, and adoring power and its camp is another. Now, more than ever before, democracy and resistance seem to be at opposite ends. Taking care of this issue will probably be the title of the coming chapter in the life of the Lebanese, their suffering, and their feeling that no matter what they decide, the weapons will remain pointed at them!
