Because the revolution succeeded in Egypt after it had succeeded in Tunisia, this success was bound to encourage the different “arenas” throughout the region to spread the model of drastic change. And because Egypt was playing and is continuing to play a leading role in the Arab world and among the Arab countries and constitutes a pivotal state, its revolution was bound to be echoed in Northern Africa and the entire Middle East. On the other hand, the action spreading in Syria, which is also a pivotal country in the Arab East and is the “heart” of Pan-Arabism, was bound to carry wide repercussions equaling the ones emanating from Cairo, thus hitting the different sides where it hurts. Indeed, the action over there is growing into the issue of Greater Syria and the Fertile Crescent and not that of Damascus alone. Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Palestine will not be spared from its results and consequences, which means that the entire region will witness the transformation of the political equations and the map of alliances from Iran to the Mediterranean. The revolutions, from Tunisia to Yemen, going through Libya and Egypt, drew up a clear course for the outcome of the action, although the models differed. They also placed the regime - whichever one - before a difficult double equation: Firstly, they toppled the barrier of fear from the oppression of the security apparatuses, considering that the use of power expanded the number of the disgruntled, while the feelings of humiliation and injustice escalated the anger. However, if the demonstrators are allowed to proceed, their numbers will increase due to the feeling that the authority is too weak and impotent to confront them. This increase will prevent the response through random shootings, block the way – indefinitely – before dialogue and open the door before the winds of interference from the close and distant neighbors. Indeed, what thwarted the negotiations between the protesters in Yemen and the regime was the massacre perpetrated a few days ago on Change Square. This massacre hastened the search for mechanisms to oust President Ali Abdullah Saleh and secure power transition, while what hastened the international intervention in Libya was the march of the regime's brigades onto the neighborhoods and cities. Secondly, there is no longer any ceiling for the demands on the “squares,” as long as the ceiling of the regime in Egypt – the biggest Arab country – collapsed on top of the regime, while the same was seen in Tunisia. The ongoing action in more than one Arab country showed that the demands escalated with each wave of rejection or stalling exercised by the rule, or with any attempt to flee forward either through threats or promises. It also proved that what the people could have accepted yesterday but was rejected by the authority, was no longer acceptable today, while what is acceptable today will no longer be so tomorrow or the day after. Therefore, there is no way to elude the voice of the street or to face the street with counter crowds. This was done by Colonel Gaddafi who deployed his armed brigades and caused himself to be confronted by the NATO fleets, thus leading Libya toward the unknown. For their part, his rivals who are holding on to unity may have no choice but to proceed with civil war or division, each being worse than the other. And between the two, the confused international intervention with its different agendas is no better. As for President Ali Abdullah Saleh, he prompted his supporters to take to the streets to establish balance with those objecting to and opposing his regime, but they gradually started dispersing and eventually forced him to choose between bloodbaths or the respect of the will of the people to distance the “Libya cup” from Yemen. But now that the high winds are blowing over Syria following the expansion of the protests which exited Daraa and its surroundings, will Damascus offer a different third or fourth model for the outcome of the action, i.e. one which is different from the Egyptian-Tunisian model, the Libyan model and the Yemeni model? Damascus can no longer export its crises and must find a way to spare the country from what is yet to come. The image of the regime is no longer similar to the one that existed before the recent events. Indeed, the demonstrations South of the country were echoed in other regions, thus prompting an urgent basket of reforms and measures which remained insufficient, as well pro-regime protests on other squares. But neither step will distance the difficult options, considering that the confrontation of the demonstrations with further violence will only escalate the situation. Violence generates violence and the “distribution of the squares” could divide the country into opposite streets witnessing fighting between the oppositionists and the loyalists. This might lead the situation toward the prohibited, i.e. sectarian and confessional strife, at a time when the gradual response to or attempts to elude the urgent political demands will prompt additional concessions, reaching the level of asking the regime to disband itself. The spread of the action has weakened – if not toppled – the official talk about a “third party,” “infiltrators” and “strangers” on the squares and the streets, dragging the people and the security bodies toward confrontation. This talk, in addition to the tales of the official media and the fabrications of the advisers and some heads of apparatuses, should not conceal the fact that the people feel they are being treated unfairly; that corruption is spreading; that there are no freedoms, justice or equality; that the citizens are being humiliated under the tyranny of the apparatuses; and that they are enduring massive economic and social troubles. All these factors constitute lethal weapons in the hands of the regime's opponents, among the traditional ones – i.e. the parties and committees - on the domestic scene and abroad, considering that today the latter are contributing to the fueling of the anger against the rule. The regime's recognition of the existence of angry people is a necessary preliminary step toward reform and the absorption of the protests, as it is no longer useful to flee outside the border. Throughout the past few years, the United States and some European and Arab countries tried to change the so-called “behavior” of the “rejectionist” regime in Syria. But their attempts failed, as did all the attempts to distance Damascus from the axis of Tehran and its allies in the region. Damascus' opponents used to accuse it of having focused all its efforts outside the border, i.e. on the “arenas” of the neighbors, which provided it with a safety raft against all the powerful storms that hit the region in the last four decades. They also accused it of exercising politics and playing a role at the level of the neighbors' crises, instead of turning toward the domestic arena. Today however, the storm is advancing on more than one Syrian “arena” and the regime has no choice but to turn toward domestic affairs and decrease its involvement in foreign ones. There is no doubt that Damascus' “rejectionism” was able to overcome many types of blockades and foreign pressures that never stopped, and even escalated since the American war on Iraq and until the exit of the Syrian troops from Lebanon. Today, the question is: Will this “rejectionism” succeed on the domestic scene the way it did on the foreign one? Would it not be useful to rely on some “successes” abroad and exploit them to generate breakthrough at the level of the domestic crisis before it is too late? The continuous reliance on the foreign “arenas” in the face of the domestic demands is not the solution and cannot constitute an alternative for the response to the people's demands or a pretext to appease the spirits. This card has become old, or is no longer at the top of the list of priorities of the protesters who are seeking justice, equality, freedom, the ending of oppression, the containment of the apparatuses and the regaining of dignity. President Bashar al-Assad who always spoke about reform, modernization and the fighting of corruption, can take matters into his own hands without the use of the official media outlets, the advisers or the traditional partisan or security apparatuses. Ever since he assumed presidency, he made numerous promises of reform, and tried – following the American deployment on his Eastern border – to change the political and economic faces. However, he was obstructed by the party and its traditional leaders, and by the inherited and benefitting power centers. Today nonetheless, the crisis requires courageous and decisive decisions. It requires a clear roadmap for real and palpable reforms that meet the demands of the people and appease the wave of anger, instead of resorting to the “theories” of circles that live in the past, merely increase the anger of the people, and deepen the loss of confidence in the regime. It is as though those promoting these theories did not follow the events in Tunisia and Egypt, or what is happening in Libya and Yemen among other countries in the region. These “theories” do not insult people's intelligence as much as they harm the authority and depict it as being distant from the current day and age! What is required is a wide and convincing package of drastic political, economic and social reforms and measures, to be adopted all at once and not in batches. This is due to the fact that the gradual response to people's demands might push toward a ceiling that the regime will not be able to meet, as it was seen in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. As for those closely watching what is happening in Syria and awaiting an opportunity to interfere, they must beware of contributing to the fueling of the tensions, because the fall of this country in the flames of chaos and violence will not spare them. One way or the other, these flames will get to them, from Lebanon to Jordan, Palestine and Iraq. Therefore, the regime must be urged and helped to switch its approach toward the issue of the required “change” and to reposition itself on the map of the region in order to spare the country from what is even worse. So, will the action in Syria present a model that is different from that of the revolutions we have witnessed and are still witnessing? Is it too late to see such an experience or are we about to see a slide into another model which is unique but is certainly bitter for both sides, i.e. for those demanding change and the regime, but also the neighbors?
