The sweeping changes and popular revolutions underway in the Arab world have become an international issue par excellence. The situation requires the great powers and ruling teams in Western states to closely follow up and enhance everything taking place in these Arab countries, and work to keep up with the changes taking place in the Arab world. It has gone so far as to see that the stance taken in some of these countries has become a matter of constant domestic debate: about the international intervention, or lack thereof, how far it will go, and the objectives and dimensions of this intervention. This is taking place in the United States between Republicans and Democrats, and in Russia, between this or that side in the power equation, as well as in other countries. The developments in the direction of change, which has been less costly when it took place in Tunisia and Egypt, have prompted a re-think of foreign policies in Washington and Western countries, because of the fears that this change would have an impact on Israel. However, the domino effect of these changes has begun to require the international community and leading powers to think about something that goes beyond anxiety over Israel, and Israel's fears vis-à-vis these changes. The silly Israeli excuses, namely that these changes indicated Israel was the only stable state in the region, and that it monopolized democracy for its chosen people, quickly retreated. These included the idea that everything around Israel was beset by turbulence, or that the United States and the West erred by abandoning their allies quickly, for the mere fact that the regimes of Husni Mubarak and Zine el-Dine bin Ali were among those that the Jewish state felt comfortable with, in its drive to end the Palestinian issue. The internationalization of dealing with the changes in the Middle East has gone beyond the superficial readings, to something considerably more profound. As the revolutions have moved from country to country, it has constituted a call for change in the entire world: foreign and economic policies, in their condescending view of the Middle East, since the reservoir of popular movement has unleashed tremendous capabilities, which cannot be brought under control by the existing, obsolete political structures in these countries. The West had accepted coexistence with these regimes, under the rubric of “stability,” for decades. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 imposed a no-fly zone over Libya and protection for Libyan civilians, with whom Moammar Gaddafi dealt militarily like they were rats, represents the height of internationalization of dealing with Arab revolutions. However, this internationalization has been preceded by earlier expressions of dealing with the popular movement in other countries. It is no coincidence that officials and leaders in all countries rushed to Egypt and Tunisia in order to closely follow up what was taking place elsewhere. There has been anxiety over international intervention in crises of regimes that are witnessing revolutions breaking out in order to bring about change, which is legitimate, and a duty. However, the launch of these revolutions from within each country, as a result of accumulation of oppression, injustice, corruption, and dictatorship, also involves elements of control, and sets limits to this intervention, making it difficult to imagine that a re-run of the Iraq scenario will take place. There are objective elements governing the internationalization of which Libya is becoming a model. The West is no longer able to repeat the Iraqi experience, because of the losses and failures that are involved. This is one reason that explains the hesitation governing the decision by the White House to become military involved; this hesitation is a result of its “Iraq complex.” In addition to the fact that international intervention in Libya rested on a request from the Arab League, and not only the Libyan opposition, the course taken by Gaddafi's military campaign has begun to warn that it will hold the international community responsible for the massacres it commits, or will commit, due to the superiority of its military forces. The world has yet to recover from its responsibility for the massacres of civil conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s. It is natural for countries to be anxious, if Gaddafi succeeds in preventing the popular uprising from taking over power and manages to turn Libya into a safe haven for al-Qaida and terror, which he is well-versed in carrying out against all of the states that have supported his ouster. These states cannot sit idly by and watch Gaddafi regain control over his country's vast resources, along with his family. In this scenario, he would continue his mad control over the investment of billions of dollars in Libya in the last few years, and then blackmail the countries that have favored his downfall. He would use the revenues from this wealth in Africa, which is a candidate to see the spread of popular uprisings to some of its countries, or in the relationship with other countries engaged in a confrontation with the international community. The international community cannot turn its back on the dangerous possibilities after the change in Libya, as it did with Afghanistan, when it helped liberate the country from Soviet occupation in 1989, allowing the Taliban and extremism to dominate. Unlike Iraq, international intervention is regulating, through multi-national means, the international competition over containing the Libyan revolution, instead of US unilateralism. This intervention is leading to political agreements between countries that are dominant (Russia and America) and central (Turkey and Germany) in nurturing the changes in the Arab world.
