Egypt and the United States share a deep-rooted relationship, as a result of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Indeed, this treaty has quelled all of the US's apprehensions, centered on Israel's security, by neutralizing the Egyptian front. In other words, it has achieved an exceptional strategic breakthrough in the system of defense of the Hebrew state, Washington's central concern in the region. The treaty has also ensured Egypt billions of dollars of US aid, needed to compensate for its large economic deficit, in hopes that this would contribute to long-term stability. The United States today, with the eruption of the protest movement in Egypt, seems unable to maintain the nature of mutual interests in its relationship with Egypt. The ambiguity of the US stance reveals the concern of maintaining the commitment to the peace treaty with Israel, and what this means in terms of maintaining the regime in Cairo and its ability to remain loyal to the treaty's commitments, while at the same time asking it to meet the demands of protesters, with what this could entail in terms of weakening the regime's structure and the possibility of it being exposed to breaches that might force it to reconsider the nature of the Egyptian-Israeli relationship, already a lukewarm one. It also seems that President Barack Obama's Administration, in the words of all of its officials, is trying to bring into agreement two goals that may not be compatible. Indeed, on the one hand, this administration seeks to appear as one defending human rights and democracy in Egypt, and to provide a starting point for the current president's next electoral campaign. Yet that is a difficult situation, in view of the strong relationship between Washington and Cairo, within the maelstrom of Egyptian forces seeking to change the regime, as these forces have interpreted the US stance as encouraging them to move forward in demanding that the regime be dismantled – the latter being expressed by Egyptian figures described as liberal (i.e. influenced by US stances). On the other hand, Washington seeks to maintain the regime in order to ensure the continuity of what the Administration considers to be its interest in maintaining commitment to the treaty with Israel, having from the start been aware of the danger that might face this treaty in case of change in Egypt. Moreover, it is not unlikely for the Israeli lobby to have moved in Washington in order to restrain enthusiasm for the campaign against the Egyptian regime and President. This explains US ambiguity in how to resolve the Egyptian crisis. Indeed, on the one hand, it is encouraging those calling for changing the regime to move forward with their movement, while on the other encouraging the Egyptian army to find a way out. Such ambiguity is on the rise after the series of concessions offered by the regime when faced with the demands of protesters. Indeed, the campaign against President Hosni Mubarak has increased and become well-entrenched following the announcement of such concessions, especially on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has managed to attract liberal figures to support its stance on the regime. Moreover, the Brotherhood realizes that this opportunity to cause a major breach in the regime may not come again for years ahead. This is why it must make use of it to the fullest extent in order to undermine the regime, weaken it and reserve for itself a place in it, if toppling it is not currently possible. It is no coincidence that the Muslim Brotherhood, which used to hold against the regime its treaty with Israel and to criticize it on this basis, especially after Hamas assumed control in the Gaza Strip, has been closely associating itself with demands to uphold human rights and democracy with the eruption of the protest movement, suggesting its desire to “cool down” the issue of the peace treaty, which worries Washington, if such “cooling down” is useful for efforts to weaken the Egyptian regime. Noteworthy is the fact that the US campaign against the Egyptian regime is reminiscent of those Washington used to wage against the regimes of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War, the very war that consolidated the US's relationship with Islamist movements, under the slogan of fighting against the Soviets and Atheism, especially with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan… The sequel to that story was when the US was forced to invade that country once again in order to contain the “terrorism” of those same movements. The situation in Egypt might not reach such an extent, but the question remains over the ability to bring into agreement the current campaign against the regime and attempts to save it at the same time.
