When the formula of ruling in Lebanon thrived, the Rahbani Brothers emerged, and when it went bankrupt, along came “Boutros Harb's project”. The Rahbani Brothers presented an image of Lebanon in which all the conflicts were reduced between its people to futile disputes over the right to cross the stairs for example. They portrayed a situation in which there is no fighting between the rich and the poor, and a total absence of any class, partisan or sectarian belonging that could create separations among the unified Lebanese people, under a just rule which sometimes has to resort to power to serve higher national interests. This is how the Rahbani Brothers depicted President Fouad Chehab's term and the eponymous stage [in history], especially in the play “The Days of Fakhreddine.” It is needless to say that the work of the brothers was more diverse, and that part of it tackled the facets of social discrepancies and political oppression. However, in their description of the Chehabist formula as the best formula to regulate the relations among the Lebanese, they ignored many obvious weaknesses in the political system, in the face of the activation of the state institutions and the expansion of their sectarian base through the opening of the door before the cadres coming from peripheral regions. The Chehabist version of the Lebanese formula promised an honest and just division of public wealth (without affecting the massive wealth of local and foreign individuals and institutions), the abstinence from provoking problems with the Arab milieu, and the avoidance of clashes with the traditional leaders of the sects, while working on finding alternative solutions. In short, the “achieved” Chehabism (as opposed to the “imagined” Chehabism portrayed by the Rahbani brothers), sought more progress and justice for the Lebanese society, without affecting its economic and social contradictions and without trying to exit them. As it is known, the stage in which the Lebanese formula was thriving ended long before the civil war. Then came the years of infighting to proclaim the necessity of moving toward a new formula, while the balances of local powers and the regional climates only allowed a renewed sectarian formula adopted in the Taif Accord and ratified by the constitutional amendments of 1990. And ever since the eruption of the current national crisis in 2005, it turned out that the sectarian system was also in need of reconsideration. Indeed, among the signs of the crisis is the rise of Christian immigration and the reduction of their demographic weight in a way that allowed the Muslims, both Sunnis and Shiites, to easily occupy all the positions vacated by the Christians on the political and human levels. The mind of what Deputy Walid Jumblatt refers to as “Political Maronitism” (to reuse a name which was very common on the eve of and during the civil war) could not produce a solution that would handle this problem in-depth, and thus targeted the external appearance and form, including the phenomenon of the Christians' selling of their lands. Indeed, Minister Boutros Harb proposed a draft-law banning the selling of land between the followers of the sects of different religions (Christians and Muslims) for fifteen years. Harb thus failed to tackle the complex problem in Lebanon and turned toward the details, while supported by members of the different sects. However, had the project been ratified fifteen years ago, i.e. in 1995, how would the picture look today? That year witnessed the renewal of President Elias Hrawi's term as one of the signs of the Syrian power control in Lebanon and the pushing of Christians aside. It also witnessed the expansion of the financial and economic projects linked to Rafik al-Hariri. We do not believe that the status of Christians in power today is worse than what it was in 1995, at a time when the crisis of the regime and the formula managing it are escalating. Why is that? Boutros Harb's project does not answer this question.
