The recent demonstration staged by President Omar Hassan al-Bashir in Juba yesterday, which was wanted to be one of “unification,” constituted the last nail in the coffin of Sudan's unity. He wanted to say he was still holding on to the unity of the country, even until a few days before the referendum over the independence of the South. However, what he actually said enumerated the advantages of this independence which he said will allow peace to prevail and will achieve what unity has failed to. Al-Bashir came to Juba to announce before the leaders of the South that “if the South chooses secession, I will be happy because we would have accomplished peace for Sudan on both sides. If you choose secession, I will celebrate with you. The benefits we can secure through unity can be secured in the presence of two states.” Everyone is aware of the reasons that led the situation between the North and the South to where it is now, despite a peace agreement which continued to be implemented under Al-Bashir's presidency for six years without it convincing anyone in the South of the benefits of unity. Everyone is also aware of the fact that Al-Bashir's rule is unattractive to both the Southerners and the Northerners. And while the Southerners have lost faith in this rule and are heading toward secession, some in the North are feeling the same way and are heading toward the confrontation of this rule. This may be the reason why Al-Bashir decided to visit Juba on the eve of the referendum. The leadership of the ruling People's Front in the South used the visit to organize an official celebration in honor of the president of the “sisterly state in the North” because it is aware of the fact that this visit will legitimize the independence of the South, for the accomplishment of which all the capacities have been mobilized during the referendum which will be held on January 9. Moreover, the Southern leaders are not as foolish as to believe that the mere visit of Al-Bashir to Juba will bolster the unity option. They organized a popular and official reception for Al-Bashir because they know that the visit will constitute a pass toward secession and an early recognition of the results of the referendum. But why did Al-Bashir insist on conducting this visit, which serves and legitimizes secession? It is most probable that the messages carried by the visit are meant for the North and not just for the South. In other words, they seek the accomplishment of Northern goals in the face of the expected opposition voiced against the outcome of Al-Bashir's policy, but also the justification of any future steps which might be undertaken by the Northern authority to block the way before that action. It is consequently some sort of a preemptive attack - by the South - against the North. This attack is based on the insistence on unity until the last moment, as well as on the insistence on coexistence with the newborn state. This would allow the confirmation of the fact that President Al-Bashir has become indispensable to secure these options, i.e. the peace options with the South, whether through the recognition of the results of the referendum or through non-hostility toward the newborn state. Consequently, any questioning of these options - despite the direct responsibility of the authority in Khartoum for having reached them – will become a questioning of peace itself, thus turning the criticizers of Al-Bashir's rule in the North the callers for war with the South. Moreover, this attack is based on the reinstatement of Islamic slogans in the face of Northern sides drawing their entire political legitimacy from the fact that they are Islamic leaders with an old history in the country. In this context, it was not a coincidence for the “frienemies,” i.e. Sadek al-Mahdi and leader of the People's Congress Party and engineer of Al-Bashir's coup Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, to agree before the supporters over the fact that Al-Bashir's promise to implement the Shariaa was an outbidding which was disfiguring the image of Islam in Sudan. Moreover, they called for the reinstatement of the Islamic slogans as a political weapon in the face of the enemies not only to maintain power, but also to deal with the numerous problems which will emerge during the post-secession stage – namely the management of the relations and disputes with the South, the management of the issues of the Sudanese regions in the East and West, and the drafting of the new political map in Khartoum.
