The interventions and statements of a number of leaders in the March 14 forces reveal a deep crisis at the level of diagnosing, understanding and dealing with Hezbollah's demands and sensitivities. The speeches which were delivered during the Tripoli celebration a few days ago, are at the core of the domestic mobilization of the team that delivered them and do not mean much in light of the already tense situation in the country. As for comparing Hezbollah's ideas to the Nazi creed, the least that could be said about it is that it stems from an unsound comparison between the two doctrines and the two political environments from which the National Socialist (Nazi) Party and Hezbollah emerged. Indeed, the latter never fooled anyone with the illusion of exiting the sectarian-popular framework toward a national-statist framework, whereas Nazism - and all its previous and future offshoots - is based on the confiscation of the entire national space and on “evening out” the nationalist, ethnical and partisan protrusions by use of power. From the Communist Party to the Catholic Church, the campaigns of pursuit and liquidation did not stop during the Nazi era. Hezbollah's situation is very different, since in many circumstances it was forced to take into account the popular “specificities,” such as tribal belongings and the statuses of certain religious families. Consequently, the security mayhem in the Southern suburb – i.e. Hezbollah's stronghold and fortification – stands as proof for the party's abstinence from sliding toward a confrontation whose results cannot be predicted with the clans and families that are drawing their strength from sources which do not please any doctrinal party, including the religious parties. While the party is clearly trying to lead the state, its institutions and policies in the direction of its own interests and visions, this is different from the imposition of its direct hegemony, a hegemony for which the fascists have no other alternative. In any case, the issue does not reside in the terminological or methodical definition of Hezbollah's ideology, but in the March 14 team's inability to respond to the challenge represented by the party which is relying on its own strength and on a system of local and foreign alliances it was able to build. On the other end of this strength and system, there are empty expressions being issued, ranging between the “total reliance on the state and its apparatuses to defend the Lebanese” and threats to “break the fingers and remove the eyes,” in addition to what was produced by the eloquence of Deputy Muhammad Kabbara at the Tripoli celebration. The adoption of “finger breaking” to respond to those talking about “the severance of hands” will not establish a new balance of power between the Lebanese, while the threats that do not rely on actual and material strength are not enough to convince the other side about the seriousness of the threat. This is an exposed game which no political amateur ever believes anymore. In short, the March 14 forces are reiterating in their speeches the same failures they have shown in their political performance. Therefore, these forces which know that the conflict is ongoing and will end outside the context of the state institutions and that the settlement – whether it is peaceful or violent – will be imposed on the state also from outside the institutions and based on the real balance of power, were unable to develop a series of political and “cultural” responses to Hezbollah's rhetoric. And between “finger breaking” and the “resemblance with Nazism” lies a vacuum filled by the illusions of foreign mediations and appreciated efforts.
