President Barack Obama's tour of Asia did not bring him the momentum of leadership he wishes to regain, after having declined as a leader who took the world's breath away a mere two years ago. Barack Obama's relapse has not been limited to the results of the midterm elections in the US, but also holds an aspect of the utmost importance on the international scene. This is why the US President did not listen to the advice to cancel his trip to India, Indonesia, China and South Korea, to participate in the G20 Summit, in order to focus on purely domestic issues. He went to India in order to send a message to China, not just because India itself is a very important strategic partner for the United States. He went to Indonesia not just because it is the largest Muslim country, but also because he wanted to restore some of the shine he earned when he addressed Muslims a year and a half ago from Cairo. In China, Barack Obama walked on many a tight rope, especially as Beijing heard the message he sent it from India, which can be summed up by saying that the United States has other options in terms of major strategic partnerships, and that it is not true that Washington has no choice but to submit to what Beijing wants, at the bilateral, regional or international levels. Then Barack Obama prepared for an exceptional summit in Seoul, exceptional because it speaks the language of economics and financial crises, and of what the available ways to emerge from them are. Yet everywhere the US President went he was being pursued by the hot button issues that had poured cold water on his leadership, as they had purposely made him fail and made him a hostage to the dictates of smaller players. Indeed, Israel has made Barack Obama fail by taking measures that in effect dwarf his political ambitions, as they dwarf his image internationally. Iran and Syria have made Barack Obama fail and made him look naïve, having embraced the path of accommodation, engagement and dialogue with them, only to receive one slap in the face after another from each of them in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. Lebanon has suddenly turned into a fabricated battlefield between Hezbollah and the Barack Obama Administration, i.e. between an armed organization and the world's sole superpower. And then there are the bomb-laden packages which nearly caused disasters, had it not been for information from Saudi Arabia's intelligence. There is also Yemen, which stands at the tipping point due to turning into a base of operations for Al-Qaeda, one that is scientifically advanced and able to manufacture bomb-laden packages of this caliber. And because all of these issues have an impact on Barack Obama, as a President and as a leader, as well as on US interests (even if they seem to common Americans like issues that are of no interest to them), there is increasing talk of the possibility for the US President to speak a language of “or else”, so as to be taken seriously in the wake of the relapse. Talk has also emerged of the kinds of options available in terms of “consequences”. Then came former President George W. Bush's memoirs, to suggest to the current president a few options, if he wishes to make use of them. Nevertheless, not all options are military, nor are they exclusive to taking measures to impose bilateral or international sanctions. Indeed, the surprise brought about by taking measures not expected to come from Barack Obama would have a significant impact. And there are measures that can be taken which might not have “fangs” in effect and at the moment, but which would strike at the core and be painful. Today more than at any other time before, President Barack Obama needs to settle matters by taking decisive measures. Yet before doing so, he needs to honestly review his policies, so that he may himself conclude where he had been right and how he has made mistakes. George W. Bush may not realize that there is tremendous contradiction in his saying that the reasons for his war on Iraq were wrong but that his decision to wage the war was not. The justifications for the war were wrong, but the decision to go to war was right, regardless of the fact that the pretexts were fabricated and groundless? Bush says he still feels sick when he remembers that waging the war – which led to the death of a hundred thousand Iraqis – under the pretext of Iraq possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction was nearly a mistake because the United States discovered – after the war – that there were no Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq. What George W. Bush did not speak of is whether he really knew in advance that the Iraq War was essentially for the sake of Israel and Iran. He says that history will tell what happened during his presidency, and that we do not know what history will record then. Had his Vice President Dick Cheney written his memoirs truthfully, and had his Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld done so as well, George W. Bush himself would have benefited and would have learned whether the Iraq War had purposely, essentially and by a decision taken in advance been aimed at strengthening Iran in the region and at removing Iraq completely from the strategic military equation between the Arabs and Israel. Indeed, before its social fabric was destroyed by the sanctions of the Bill Clinton Administration, and before it was destroyed in George W. Bush's war, Iraq used to represent Israel's greatest concern, due to its military capabilities. That Iraq was also an ally of the United States, receiving US assistance in its war against Iran, in order to ward off exporting the Iranian Islamic revolution to the neighboring Gulf countries. President Saddam Hussein, whom the United States later toppled, considered himself an indispensable partner for the Americans, after they made him feel that he was above dispensability. Bush's war in Iraq destroyed Iraq in the strategic equation with Israel and strengthened the Islamic Republic of Iran purposely. The question that must be answered today is whether the greater US decision is still to move forward with strengthening the regime of the mullahs in Iran and to enable the Islamic Republic to export its revolution and impose its hegemony on the region, or not. Barack Obama inherited what George W. Bush did in Iraq. He focused entirely on the “mistake” of the war in Iraq and pledged not to repeat this “mistake” in Iran, which is why he focused on the political and diplomatic aspect, nearly excluding – not ruling out – the military option. What Obama did not do is profoundly analyze the political map of the Middle East in the wake of Bush's war and carefully examine what the leaders of the Bush Administration had in mind when they gave rise to these new balances of power. Israel today, for example, is not entirely clear about the issue of Iran. Indeed, on the one hand, it issues statements and public stances that call on the US President to make use of the language of serious “consequences” with Iran in order to force it to put a stop to its nuclear program. And on the other hand, Israel nearly disregards and is noticeably less concerned about the spread and the advance of Iran's tentacles in the Middle East, reaching the border with Israel. It is unclear whether what is taking place inside Israel and in active international and American Jewish circles is coordinated role play or whether it really is division. Indeed, on the one hand, one party sounds the drums of doom and says that Iran obtaining nuclear weapons would threaten the existence and survival of Israel and would be something that it could never live with. This party opposes being content with international and bilateral sanctions, and considers that the beginning or the middle of next year, 2011, must be the time to resolve the issue militarily, either through a military strike against Iran's nuclear reactors or through a proxy war against Iran via Hezbollah in Lebanon – an Israeli military strike that would implicate the United States or a radical change in “Obamist” politics that would surprise those who have wagered on Barack Obama's patience. The other party in the Israeli and American Jewish camp says that a military strike would be worse than living with a nuclear Iran. The reason, according to them, is that such a strike – especially if it involves Israel implicating the United States – would unleash American hatred towards the Jews and “anti-Semitism” like never before. They say that the cost of such a strike would be exorbitant, at the very least because it will lead to Israel losing its status of spoiled child of the US, because it would bear responsibility for the collapse of the US economy due to what would follow the military action in terms of measures taken by Iran that would severely impact the oil market. Who will Barack Obama listen to? And does he have other options to rein in Iran's nuclear challenges and its ambitions of regional hegemony? Perhaps another visit by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would awaken the Obama Administration to paying heed to the necessity of carefully analyzing what Iranian leaderships have in mind. Indeed, his visit to Lebanon led to awakening the Obama Administration, which in turn led to undermining its blind enthusiasm towards repairing relation with Syria at any cost, as long as the possibility of splitting Syria away from Iran flickers in the distance. Perhaps Ahmadinejad's visit – if he accepts the invitation – to Gaza would awaken the Obama Administration to the profound strategic dimension of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Recent developments in Lebanon have undermined the theory of the “split”, especially as public statements by the US Administration have accused Syria of providing Hezbollah with weapons, accompanied by a tone nearing that of a warning, avoiding the alarm of a clear “or else”. Indeed, the Obama Administration is still in the midst of sorting out its policies, after having relied on the “soundness” of the doctrine of embracement, accommodation and dialogue as the only means of causing change and understandings. Thus, after the Obama Administration was disappointed as a result of the resolve of the players to make its policies fail, it began to reconsider. Yet it did this without severing the threads of dialogue behind the scenes, in a language that lets the other side believe that the US Administration's public discourse is meant merely to contain criticism, while at the core it is still forgiving. Yet there are increasing warnings to those who wager on Obama's patience, and on his not holding options of war, that he has the element of surprise and could take unusual measures. With Syria, for example, Obama needs no more than to sever relations with Damascus to make it fail as it had made him fail, knowing that what the Syrian leadership wants the most is to maintain relations and forge a special relationship with the US Administration. There are those who speak of measures against Syria at the Security Council, if Damascus were to repeat the mistakes of the past and excessively miscalculate in Lebanon. According to them, even if US efforts to have a resolution issued that would impose sanctions on Syria were to fail, the Obama Administration merely taking the initiative of taking such a measure would represent a painful blow at the core. And if Hezbollah were to stage a coup against the Lebanese government, the Security Council would also be the arena for undermining Hezbollah through economic and military sanctions that would shackle both Hezbollah and Lebanon. Similarly with Israel, the Obama Administration has the option of using the Security Council, knowing that there is nearly global readiness for issuing a Security Council Resolution that would define the Palestinian state and place Israel in complete isolation, after it frustrated everyone by refusing to stop settlement-building, even temporarily. Iran falls under a regime of sanctions imposed by the Security Council, yet there are calls, such as the one made by international Iranian law expert and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi, to issue a resolution from the Council that would denounce Tehran's record of human rights violations and “bring the voice of the people of Iran and the political prisoners to the outside world”. The military plans exist, as Bush said in his memoirs, but Obama's options are not necessarily only of an exclusively military nature.
