There is no longer any doubt about the fate of unified Sudan. Indeed, that country is headed towards being split into two states, a Northern and a Southern one, and it has passed the point of no return. The referendum to determine the future of the South, scheduled on the coming January 9, will only be the occasion to announce the independence of the new country. Everything the central government in Khartoum is doing and announcing, within the framework of its assertion of clinging to unity, will not delay the event and will not affect its results. And everything the regional government in the South is doing focuses on the goal of secession. Such an outcome is the result of the circumstances that surrounded the ratification of the Naivasha Agreement six years ago, especially as the interim period, provided in the agreement in order to make unity attractive, has revealed quarrelling between those that were supposed to be the two partners in rule: the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in the North and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) ruling in the South. Such quarrelling has not just been linked to mismanaging the transitional period, but has also been rooted in the relationship between North and South and in the civil war that lasted for more than 20 years, with what it carried in terms of tragedy and hatred. Furthermore, the Darfur crisis has come to add a new element of quarrelling, in view of the strategy adopted by the central government and by President Bashir's cabinet, based on considering force to be the only solution to the crises of this country of vast expanses and of multiple ethnic, religious and tribal groups. In fact, one could say that Bashir signing the Naivasha Agreement included at its core the realization that the independence of the South would be the price for this agreement which ended the civil war. Perhaps this realization is what made it necessary for Bashir to remain in power, in order to bring the agreement to its logical conclusion. It is also what has made the West – which on the whole supports the secession – maintain its relationship with the regime in Khartoum, in spite of all that was said about UN accusations regarding the practices engaged in by the government in the Darfur province, accusations reaching up to the Sudanese President himself. Thus, one might say that the countdown to the secession of Southern Sudan has begun. The questions now raised address the manner in which this secession is to take place, as well as its results at the domestic level in Sudan, knowing that this will be an unprecedented event both at the level of the Arab World and that of Africa. Despite the fact that the independence of Southern Sudan has been declared, in effect, since the ratification of the Naivasha Agreement, the Sudanese regime seeks, in the three months until the date of its declaration, to show that it is clinging to unity and working for it. The only opportunity left for this might be through verbal escalation and the support of movements in the border regions between North and South. Talk in Khartoum of “Jihad” to defend national unity and mobilization within the ranks of the Messiria tribe in the Abyei region, despite the decision made by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding it, may drive to escalation on the field, aimed at covering up the stance on secession and at finding a new reason to justify Bashir remaining in power. When a prominent figure such as Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi, one of the architects of Bashir's coup and of those who know his methods best, warns of a scenario such as this, one should take such a warning into consideration. Indeed, any new war between North and South will not be limited to this part of Sudan, but will rather set ablaze yet again all currently inactive fronts, especially in the East, and the current front in Darfur will be rekindled. Furthermore, such a war would increase the crisis in the relationship between Northern political parties, especially between the ruling party and the opposition, of which the majority leans towards the choice of peaceful secession and of organizing a relationship of cooperation and complementarity with the fledgling nation. The task of organizing peaceful secession might well be the current priority, instead of sounding the drums of war and of getting distracted by fabricating issues that bear no effect on the matter, such as seeking to delay the referendum and objecting to its results in advance, or declaring to refuse the presence of UN troops between North and South. And the question now raised is about the extent to which the Sudanese regime can succeed at such a task.
