The fatwa recently issued by Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the issue of Lady Aisha was met with relief within the circles of those working to bring Muslim denominations closer together. But will it be sufficient, these days, to prevent strife between Muslims? And will it be sufficient to solve the problems and political disputes between Muslims, on the background of some of them, i.e. the Sunnis, considering that there is an Iranian assault on all fronts targeting them? Indeed, at a time when media outlets in Iran and its supporters in the region placed great emphasis on the fatwa, despite it having been preceded by many fatwas from both sides, Sunni and Shiite, on Muslim unity and respecting denominations, Iran's political assault reached an advanced stage in targeting Arab policies viewed as expressing a Sunni stance or issued from Arab countries with an overwhelming Sunni majority. This is a matter that translates in popular and congregational consciousness as targeting Sunnis, directly or indirectly, while relevant fatwas lose their stated meaning. Iran has worked with all it has in terms of political and financial weight in Iraq to prevent the recent electoral process from being translated into the numerically largest parliamentary coalition assuming the position of Prime Minister. It is no secret that preventing the leader of the Iraqiya List, Ayad Allawi, from assuming the position of Prime Minister is connected to the suspicion that he leans more towards Iraqi Sunnis and to his demands to cease interfering in Iraq's affairs, especially on the part of Tehran. The past few months, which witnessed attempts to form the Iraqi government, have shown that Iran's pressures were not merely limited to excluding those “suspected” of not supporting Tehran's policies, but were also targeted at ensuring that the political parties that cling to their sectarian identity the most reach the position of Prime Minister. As a result of such pressures, Nouri Al-Maliki was imposed on the Shiite coalitions connected to Tehran as candidate for Prime Minister, in spite of a great deal of Arab and Iraqi reservations over his performance while he held the post. It has therefore been interpreted as a candidacy that does not take into consideration the interests of other Iraqi parties or those of the Arabs. At the same time, a massive campaign is being waged against the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to try those suspected of assassinating former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. And despite the justifications included in this campaign, it is difficult to clearly separate between it and the fact that the former Prime Minister was a major Sunni, Lebanese and Arab figure. This thus places the campaign engaged in by Iran's supporters in Lebanon and in the region within the framework of Shiite-Sunni opposition. The campaign also targets Saad Hariri, as Rafic Hariri's son, as a Sunni leader and as Lebanon's Prime Minister. In other words, it is doubly symbolically charged, whether within the framework of relations between Sunnis and Shiites or within that of sharing power in Lebanon. Proceeding from the campaign against the Special Tribunal, veiled doubt is being shed on the role played by Saudi Arabia, by constantly bringing up its failure to fulfill a supposed pledge to stop the Special Tribunal's formal accusation, according to an understanding, also supposed, with Syria. In parallel to this, the campaign spreads against Egypt and its policies, in all Arab issues put forward, especially in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. And everyone knows what Egypt represents in the collective consciousness of the Arabs and in that of the Sunnis in particular. This is how elements of Iranian policy are driving towards escalating the sectarian symbolic opposition, sometimes reaching beyond it to clear opposition to interests and goals in a manner that threatens of clear division on a sectarian basis. Under such tense circumstances comes the visit of President Bashar Al-Assad to Tehran, which is believed to have all of these issues on its agenda. And in spite of the exceptional strategic relationship between Syria and Iran, President Assad can play a role in attenuating Iran's zeal and enthusiasm. Such attenuation is the gateway to correcting the image of political disagreements, keeping it away from sectarian charging and warding off strife.
