Each of the United States, Iran and Syria, who have agreed over supporting Nouri Al-Maliki “without coordination”, as President Jalal Talabani said, have their own reasons for this. Indeed, Washington sees in him a “statesman” who stood up to Shiite militias, especially the Mahdi Army – having been able to force its leader Muqtada Al-Sadr to disband it, throw its commanders in jail, and seek asylum in Iran to complete his religious studies. Washington is thus wagering on Maliki maintaining his policies in order to exclude its most bitter enemies in Iraq from power. This aside, Maliki was able, during his previous term, to achieve reconciliation with a large part of the Sunni clans, and succeeded, with the help of the US Army, in forming the “Awakening” movements that expelled the Al-Qaeda organization from their areas and have come to lead the fight against this organization, after the latter had taken control of most Sunni towns and villages, thus giving Washington the opportunity to withdraw its troops. This is for the United States. As for Iran's reasons for supporting Maliki, they can be summed up by the fact that Tehran sees in him its strong man in Iraq, who has defended and continues to defend its interests. Indeed, despite fighting against some of its supporters, he has remained loyal to it. He never brought up the issue of its increasing influence, despite tremendous US pressures. He is also the most powerful among Shiite politicians, as the popularity of the Supreme Council was greatly dwindled after the death of its leader Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim and after the Badr Organization turned to political work. In addition to its interests, Iran takes into consideration the fact that Maliki is the leader of the Dawa Party, the ideology of which is close to that of its own political-religious leaders. It also does not forget the modesty he displays when he removes his necktie in the “presence” of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. As for Sadr, in spite of his strength at the popular level and the fact that he agrees with Iran's policies, he is still in the phase of political adolescence. Having failed to prove his capability in running a political party, what would happen if he were to rise to power? There remains Ahmad Chalabi, whom the US has accused of collaborating with Tehran and contributed to weakening. Chalabi has no popularity, and he cannot compete against anyone. He tried to establish the Shiite House in agreement with the religious authority in Najaf, but failed. He thus turned to the National Alliance to shield himself with his mantle of leadership, and was unable to achieve any results in the elections. Iran has kept itself away from inter-Shiite disputes in Iraq. And it has chosen the most powerful and the most experienced, i.e. Maliki. But what are the reasons that have made Syria support Maliki, after all indications had pointed to its agreeing with Saudi Arabia over supporting Ayad Allawi? In some way, Damascus is dealing with the issue of Iraq in the same way it does with that of Lebanon. Indeed, it considers it imperative to include everyone's participation in government, in view of the fact that no political party, especially its friends, is able to attain power alone. This is what Syria's Foreign Minister Walid Al-Muallem announced, saying in New York that forming a government of one color and an opposition of different colors was not suitable for Iraq at this stage. It supports Maliki but does not stand against the others, especially Allawi. In other words, it supports a balanced government that brings together the strong and does not enslave anyone. Indeed, those whom it truly supports cannot run Iraq without the others, who have asserted their presence over the past years. This is why it exerts pressures for these people to hold influential positions, even if the others hold the top positions. That is the Syrian game or “skill” in managing crises and seizing threads. Before the formation of the Iraqi cabinet, Syria was able to obtain a few concessions from Maliki. His government will return its ambassador to Damascus. The Iraqi Prime Minister also sent Assad a message, pledging to improve relations between the two countries, after he had in the past followed the Americans and leveled numerous accusations against Syria, the simplest being that it was responsible for all terrorist activity. It is the customary Syrian pragmatism. It does not stop at details. And it does not deal with others in the logic of vengeance. What concerns Damascus is strengthening its own role, whoever the Prime Minister. Iran and the US share the same kind of pragmatism. Everyone has agreed over Maliki, but agreeing over Iraq is a different matter.
