It was decided that Israel would launch its coming war on Lebanon between mid-September and the beginning of October. This was relayed by American researchers, quoting Israeli officials who visited Washington in the last few weeks. To explain the timing, it is said that President Barack Obama will be busy then with mid-term congressional elections, and in need of the Jewish vote. Thus, he will not exert any pressure on Israel to halt its war, which will strike at Lebanon's infrastructure and sensitive institutions, and thus carry out the Israeli “promises” that Beirut and its institutions will not remain outside the scope of destruction. Lebanon and Hezbollah, according to this new-old scenario, will be on the receiving end of “qualitative” blows, aimed at increasing domestic tensions between Lebanese groups and segments. These will focus on Christian areas, to destroy any cross-sectarian political cover that might be offered to protect the party. The end-game will involve pushing residents of the south and Beirut's southern suburbs, in the form of large numbers of displaced, in the direction of the capital, to spark sectarian confrontations that enflame the regions in which Hezbollah supporters and their leaders seek refuge. This is based on the “lessons” of the July 2006 war, when Hezbollah fell back on the domestic front, organizing fierce political and media campaigns against those in power, before more than three months had passed since the “divine victory.” It seems as though the same broad outlines of the above scenario are in line with the Winograd Commission findings, even though the climate in Israel is evolving after the blockade of Gaza has begun to crack. This is amid a situation of collapse being experienced by pro-peace groups among the Palestinians and the Israelis, and the deepening conviction that the United States will not support military action against Iran's nuclear program. The strange thing in what the American scholars say is the following: the government of Benjamin Netanyahu continues to insist on avoiding involvement in a direct confrontation with Syria and Iran, and that the path of negotiations is preferred in dealing with these two states. However, in return, Israel must strike at the spearhead that is constituted by Hezbollah, and deprive Damascus and Tehran of the ability to re-build and re-arm the party, by stoking a civil war in Lebanon, before beginning negotiations with these two countries, which constitute the war's true objective. Iran's response to the Israeli attack on the Fredom Flotilla might be taken as a measure of what the government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad can do: there was finally an announcement that many ships would be sent to Gaza to break the blockade and guard it by the Revolutionary Guards' naval forces, which was followed by the cancellation of the entire mission (resembling when Basij fighters headed to Tehran's airport to take part in the July War in Lebanon, which was followed by a decision from the Supreme Leader, banning this). If this is the case, we can believe that the Lebanese, whether or not they are “resisters” and “non-resisters” alike, will face any new Israeli war alone, as usual. Facing such a future as this, it is astonishing to see a Lebanese Hezbollah MP recently spread doubts about the “many groups, frameworks and fake associations that receive funds from various sources, with the aim of creating a situation of weakness in our society and moral corruption as well, and divert our society from thinking about basic issues, in the direction of concern with partial issues.” This came as part of a comment on the arrest of a suspected spy for Israel. It appears that this MP is loyal to the tradition of attacking locally, on the pretext of confronting the external danger.
