The new package of sanctions imposed on Iran clearly conveyed consensus among the major states to rule out military action. Nonetheless, it is certainly a declaration of economic war, especially since the door is open before the countries that were hoping for sanctions with sharp teeth to undertake even more painful individual measures, just as it is open before the resumption of the diplomatic option in case Tehran were to realize the meaning of the international resolution. Indeed, neither President Barack Obama nor his partners in this package excluded the latter option, while the concern to keep this door open justified the opposing Turkish position. As much as the international resolution marked yet another victory for Obama's administration, it was a major setback for Iranian diplomacy which did not know how to maintain the friendship of Russia and China, its two greatest commercial partners – whether in terms of oil or arms. It is feared in this context that the irresponsible statements of some circles in Tehran will indefinitely push the latter states toward the ranks of the enemies of the Islamic Republic. Indeed, at a time when the American president was gradually restoring his country's relations with the international players and including them in the management and resolution of the problems of the international system, President Ahmadinejad – with his “demagogic” policy as it is described by Russian officials – was taking multiple steps forward toward tightening the isolation surrounding his country. Therefore, it was naïve for anyone to think that the major powers plus Germany will accept the tripartite Iranian-Turkish-Brazilian agreement to exchange fuel abroad, as the Iranian Republic was insisting on proceeding with its uranium enrichment activities. By going back to an agreement it had turned down a few months earlier, Tehran confirmed to its opponents that it could retreat under pressure or with the imminence of the sword of the sanctions. So why stop the pressures? Had Iran taken the Russian offer to exchange fuel abroad last October, it might have spared itself this blockade and might have avoided the announced confrontation with Russia and the silent one with China. It was overly optimistic or miscalculated by the Republic to expect these states to sacrifice their interests with the United States and Europe for the sake of President Ahmadinejad whose political rhetoric toward Moscow is almost similar to his rhetoric toward the opposition on the domestic scene. Indeed, he addressed President Medvedev as though he were addressing opposition leaders Karroubi and Mousavi! The dilemma facing Iranian diplomacy has become twice as big and complicated. Before the resolution was issued, a retreat would have been less costly on the external and internal arenas. However, exiting the ranks of the International Atomic Energy Agency or toppling the tripartite agreement at this point in time would only mean further evasion and a postponement of the inescapable event. Moreover, if Tehran gets involved in negative stands in its relations with certain major states, it will subject itself to additional sanctions and deepen the crisis of trust with the international community whom it has failed to convince that it has accepted the exchange of nuclear fuel abroad. Even the circumvention of the new package of sanctions has become more difficult, although it may appear to some – as it is less costly than war - that it is not the best way to force Iran to relinquish its nuclear program or return to the negotiations table following the suspension of the enrichment activities. For its part, the leadership in Tehran must have courage so that it is not dragged behind the West's attempts to “demonize the regime” as it was done to Saddam Hussein. It must thus correct its positions and seek the bridging of the gap affecting its relations with the international community, or at least Russia and China, because a country presenting itself as the partner of major states in the drafting of not only the regional system but also the international system, must maintain the minimum level of relations with the latter states. This is not the first time that Iran finds itself in a confrontation with the world, considering that the leader of the revolution himself Imam Al-Khomeini was forced to drink the poison and accept the ceasefire with Saddam Hussein's regime, when he saw that the “Islamic Revolution” had entered a confrontation with the entire West that was waging a war in public alongside Baghdad. Regardless of how legitimate Iran's positions and how good its intentions may be, it must seek an exit from this embargo toward which it rushed or was pushed. If the West does not want to see the emergence of a major superpower that would share its influence and interests in the region for several reasons, the Islamic Republic must change its diplomacy because obstinacy and suicide will not entail any political results. Moreover, President Ahmadinejad is not Al-Khomeini, in the sense that he does not enjoy absolute legitimacy to lead the Iranian public in the direction he wants, whenever he wants to! The suffocating embargo which Ahmadinejad will face abroad will force it to increase the measures on the domestic arena, which will amplify the oppressed frustration and expand the ranks of the oppositionists who are waiting for the right opportunity. And while the sanctions primarily target the Revolutionary Guard and its military and economic wings, it will prompt the Guard and the military entities linked to it to become more involved in drawing up the country's internal and external policies, which will eventually entail the fall of the state in the hands of the Guard and its apparatuses that will gain control over all the branches of the regime indefinitely. It was believed at some point that Iran could use the numerous cards in its possession through its allies in the region from Gaza to Afghanistan, but observing Western circles affirm that the developments which preceded the ratification of the new package of sanctions revealed that these cards had started eroding and could not be exploited that easily. Indeed, the card of the blockade on the Gaza Strip was “stolen” by Turkey from the regional players, including Tehran. A noticeable indicator surfaced at this level, after Hamas's public rejection of Iranian suggestions to have Revolutionary Guard squads accompany the Freedom Flotilla ships, as it turned out that the “peaceful Jihad” undertaken by Ankara was more useful and fruitful than military Jihad, one of the disastrous repercussions of which was the blockade itself. The same applies to the situation in South Lebanon where Hezbollah does not seem to be planning on opening the front which is guarded by international soldiers from over 35 states, in accordance with Resolution 1701 that has placed and is still placing the responsibility of the Southern front in the hands of the same countries which voted in favor of the fourth package of sanctions. Moreover, the officials in Syria and Lebanon waged a wide diplomatic campaign to respond to the last Israeli threats to wage comprehensive war, following the claims related to the armament of the resistance and the undermining of the balance of power with the Hebrew State. It was as though Washington and its partners set the ceiling for the action in the South in advance. Therefore, the “missiles storm” carried multiple goals, whether in terms of allowing the passage of the indirect talks between Israel and the Palestinians under Washington's auspices, or in terms of eliminating the resistance card in advance in anticipation of any sanctions-related future developments. Even the situation in Iraq is not as suitable to Iran since it can no longer tolerate wide-scale explosions the way it used to, especially considering the fact that the date of the American pullout is dawning and it would not be in the best interest of Tehran and its allies in Baghdad – and they are a majority – to drown in additional troubles instead of consecrating their presence in the regime and the authority. In other words, the detonation of the situation is a double-edged sword, as the surprises might force Washington to reconsider its pullout schedule from the country, a thing which the Islamic Republic does not wish to see. This is due to the fact that the latter is well aware that after all these economic and human sacrifices, Washington cannot surrender the country to the Iranians, because this would simply mean the collapse of all the goals of the war and the undermining of all the American plans. Consequently, the sanctions would become worthless because the Islamic Republic will enjoy the biggest role in deciding the affairs of the region and the Gulf, including the American strategic oil and military interests. Moreover, the Iranian interference in Afghanistan – if the American accusations saying that Tehran is supporting groups from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are true – could undermine the plans of America and the NATO states or hinder the attempts to fix the political situation in the country. However, the return of the ghost of the Taliban to Kabul will not be good news to the Islamic Republic which knows that any troubles in its backyard will entail its weakening even further, as well as the thwarting of its dreams on the western bank, from the Gulf to… the Mediterranean.
