Turkey clearly expressed its discontent towards Iran, with its Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan annoucement that his expected visit to Tehran was no longer possible and that he was still waiting for it to adopt steps confirming its position in regard to Ankara's mediation in the nuclear file, among other issues! It would not take an observer a lot to know what these "issues" are. They feature the common files between the two sides. These are related to the arenas of their interests, the spaces of their ambitions and their roles in the region, from the Middle East to Central Asia and especially from Palestine, going through the Gulf and ending in Iraq. Erdogan's message was clear. It was similar to the warnings that were also issued by Russia and China. Those opposing the sanctions on the Islamic Republic are gradually losing their patience, although the Turkish position enjoys specificities and consequences that cannot be ignored by Iran, as it is watching the completion of the isolation, which it will face if the sanctions are imposed. This position places Turkey's interests and role in the region above all other considerations. Indeed, the Justice and Development Party might have felt it was necessary to reconsider its position toward the Iranian policy, while completely aware of the fact that it is facing a difficult test, in which it cannot combine one thing and its opposite. In other words, the Party cannot support the current positions of the Islamic Republic, while maintaining balanced relations with the United States, the European Union and a large number of Arab countries. It cannot vote against the sanctions or even abstain from voting, if the five great nations vote in quorum to apply them, because that would place its relations with the West in particular in an extremely sensitive and awkward position. In the meantime, it is certain that it will pay a hefty price in case no peaceful solution is reached to exit the Iranian nuclear predicament. It may be too early to conclude that the "zero problems with neighbors” policy that was launched by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu is facing a setback at the level of the relation between Ankara and Tehran. However, Erdogan's message is pushing his country toward the heart of the existing Cold War in the region, one which has long been avoided by Turkey that does not wish to face one of two choices, the sweetest of which is bitter. In other words, it does not want to be in a position, where it is either with the West or with Iran, thus losing the autonomous track it has been building throughout a decade. Indeed Turkey has made sure to maintain balanced policies, which rendered it a strategic player in more than one region, from the Balkans to Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Caucasus. Ankara called for the adoption of dialogue and opposed the sanctions due to its belief in their inefficiency and the fact that they harm the people more than they harm the governments or the regimes. In the same way, they are hurting Turkey's own interests, as Iraq's experience is still vivid. It thus supported Iran's right to acquire nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, while rejecting its acquisition of nuclear arms, seeing how it shares the concerns of the states of the region in regard to the fact that such a development will threaten the existing balance of power and security in the Middle East, which it is a part of. Therefore, it does not wish to find itself embarked on a new regional armament race, which could place additional obstacles to its already obstructed course toward the European Union, and harm the economic and developmental accomplishments it has secured in the past years. As much as it carries a “warning” to Iran, Erdogan's “message” also stems from Turkey's fear over the possible collapse of everything that was built by its foreign policy during the last few years of the term of the Justice and Development Party, especially if the window of compromise with its neighbor were to be closed and if the mediations were to collapse, the last of which being the mediation of Brazilian President Lula Da Silva. The talk is not about the war option, which would carry disastrous consequences for the entire region – including Turkey – but about the sanctions and the harm they could cause to the economies of the two neighboring states. At this point, it would be enough to point to the development of commercial trade between them, to Turkey's major role as a transit area for the Iranian gas exports to Europe and its reliance on the imports in this domain at the level of its local consumption. However, beyond the commercial ties and the nuclear file, Ankara feels that the Iranian expansion from Central Asia to the Lebanese shores, Gaza, Iraq and the Gulf has started to threaten its role, interests and the strategic relations it has been weaving in the Great “Middle East” during the last few years. It is thus not concealing its discontent toward Iran's interference in several issues, or what it considers as being its obstruction of the settlement of several dossiers. Erdogan's government has changed its policy toward Israel due to its brutal treatment of the Palestinians, which provided it with wide support around the Arab world and on the Turkish street, without this making Tel Aviv risk severing its relations with it or angering it. It led indirect talks between the latter and Damascus and is now trying to launch them again. It has sought and is still seeking the support of negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Besides, it has stressed and is still stressing the necessity to ensure reconciliation between the authority and Hamas. However, it does not like Tehran's position at the level of these two issues, considering that the latter is opposed to the entire idea of a settlement and is standing alongside the parties opposed to Mahmoud Abbas' authority. On the other hand, Turkey has weaved ties with most of the Iraqi components, from Basra to the Kurdistan province, knowing that the specificity of this province and the ambitions of its people were among the reasons behind the in-depth coordination between Ankara and the Islamic Republic, in order to contain these ambitions and the threat they pose on the “neighbors.” Nonetheless, Ankara's need for this cooperation will in no way make it accept Tehran's policy to dominate the rule in Baghdad, as it was clearly expressed by the Turkish foreign minister who said a few days ago that the solution resided in the establishment of an Iraqi government that includes all the sides. At this level, the Turkish cooperation with Syria and the Gulf States to put a halt to this Iranian momentum and prevent the isolation of the Sunnis in particular is no secret to anyone. We can enumerate many Iranian positions, which enhance these Turkish fears. The latter has made sure to strengthen its relations with the Gulf States and cannot accept the threats being issued by Tehran in the region. Moreover, Ankara's position and role in Lebanon since the 2006 war is widely known, especially at the level of what it has done and is still doing to extend the bridges between Beirut and Damascus. It has also contributed to the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Syria and is working with Riyadh to revive the relations between Damascus and Cairo. For all these considerations, Iran cannot disregard the specificity of Erdogan's “message” or Turkey itself as a major economic and oil partner. It is aware of the fact that its arch-neighbor, just like itself, is a regional superpower that cannot show any leniency toward attempts to undermine its position or role in the regional order, or affect its vital interests and relations with the Arab world and its causes. If Tehran is aware of these facts, how could it risk losing its ties with Ankara, with all what this loss will entail at the political, economic, military and security levels? Erdogan's “message” may be pointing at the inescapability of the sanctions. The leader of the Justice and Development Party may also be trying to address a message to his party's wide audience in Turkey and in the Islamic world in general, saying that he did his best and that the ball was now in Tehran's court. He is thus washing his hands from this issue in advance, and sparing himself from the consequences of any sanctions and possible developments, as well as from repercussions which may not be calculated or expected. Moreover, the message is saying to the United States and the European Union that Turkey did not turn its back on the West, which had sent it clear messages in regard to the Armenian cause, in parallel to the talk about the sanctions on Iran. Indeed, the latter messages were sent by the American Congress, which considered what happened to the Armenians during World War I to be genocide, thus leading many European governments to follow its steps and almost topple the policy of rapprochement between Ankara and Yerevan. Will this “Turkish message” be the last shot before the closure of the door of dialogue and mediations, or will it be the shot, which will force Iran to wake up and distance itself from the isolation that is threatening it and its neighbors from the four corners?
