In line with the policy adopted by the Security Council in dealing with the Sahara issue, the new UN Security Council Resolution 1920 did not move away from the logic of a political settlement that it is seeking through negotiations. Perhaps the most important reversal that the council espoused is that it did not pay much attention to the small wars that erupt from time to time among the parties involved in the [Sahara] conflict. Its authority as a sponsor appears to be thus clearer, as it strongly calls for consensus regarding the final settlement, with a view to ultimately putting it in force. Therefore, the extension of mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) for one additional year practically gives additional time for the said parties to assimilate that the framework for a settlement lies only in a political solution, and that the path to this settlement is through negotiations and nothing else. In truth, the UN Security Council's call for a new political process inherently assumes that this should not take more than one year, as much as it implicitly states that the threat of going back to arms by the Polisario is in defiance of international efforts. This is particularly valid, given the fact that the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said in a recent report that the presence of MINURSO is necessary and indispensable for upholding ceasefire. While it is a given that in the aftermath of any UNSC resolution there will be differing opinions and interoperations, it seems that in this time, such reactions digressed from the usual scope of legal and political interpretations. Instead, there were signs of a possible escalation that the region cannot tolerate. To say the least, this region faces far more dangerous challenges that leave no room for more troubles: consider for instance North Africa, which is witnessing political disputes that may be a sign of further deterioration, and also the coastal regions south of the Sahara, which are now a primary focus for international efforts, as part of what has become known as the War on Terror. Perhaps the source of these fears is the fact that the region itself is now witnessing an arms race. This is while the priorities of development, cooperation and dialogue seem absent, perhaps in order to bolster stances and keep developments in check should the practicability of negotiations come to a dead end. In truth, this is a possible contingency that cannot be discounted, unless a real desire towards the negotiations option –as a prelude to a détente- is manifested. There is no party that can feel at ease towards any negative outcome of the negotiations, because this means that the status quo will endure: this includes the situation with the Tindouf camps refugees who are taking shelter between the ground and the sky, while tragic conditions are not being mitigated, a fact that is acknowledged by the Polisario even before Morocco. This is not to mention the crisis of confidence between Rabat and Algiers, which does not help in the normalization of their bilateral relations, or in the revival of the Arab Maghreb Union on the regional level. Add to that the caution and suspicion towards what the continued impasse and stalemate might engender. In truth, the magnitude of the shared responsibilities involved here highlights the need for responsible negotiators who know what they want, and at the same time, realize the nature of the delicate balance that the region can tolerate, and which can mitigate the tensions. This is because the framework of the political solution adopted by the Security Council per se appears to be closer to any other consensual framework. This is particularly valid as it links this final goal to a consensus that is no more limited to Morocco and the Polisario, but that also involves the regional element. This is evident from the [Security Council's] call for neighbouring countries to encourage and participate in the negotiations, which is a notable development in the course of the relevant international resolutions. What is new in this iteration - which seems to be closer to realism - is that it no longer links progress to the stances of the two direct parties exclusively, but is also involving the regional element in the desired settlement. Previously, Algeria and Mauritania – as set out by the former mediator James Baker – were understood to be observing parties; but that was when they were part of the referendum plan. Today, however, the negotiations option aimed at finding a political solution is on its way to encompassing the regional parties in a different role, as evident from the fact that the UN envoy Christopher Ross asked Algeria to participate in paving the way for a solution, if not at the political level, then at least at the security and humanitarian levels. No one can evade assuming responsibilities of a humanitarian nature, in light of the increased security threats looming over the entire region.
