The slogan of the conference hosted by Tehran yesterday was “nuclear energy for all, nuclear weapons for none”, a slogan which Iran sought to be a response to the US's Nuclear Security Summit, despite the difference between the goals of those conferring. In fact, Iran deliberately mixing up the declared goal of each of those participating in the conference could lead to what it does not want. Indeed, it is in no way in Iran's interest to consider itself concerned with the possibility of nuclear materials being leaked to terrorist movements or organizations, at a time when the crisis of its nuclear issue is still being addressed in every active capital in the world. The first part of the slogan (nuclear energy for all) is the core of the international offer being made to Iran on the issue of enrichment, and a long time has gone by without Tehran putting forth what would indicate that it is willing to accept this offer, which guarantees it peaceful nuclear energy and preserves its vital interests. As for the second part of the slogan (nuclear weapons for none), it ranges from intentional naivety to a negotiation tactic which provides no guarantees about the nature of Iran's nuclear plans. The suggestions put forth by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad before the guests in Tehran have come forth to show that his country is not content to feed the obscurity surrounding its nuclear plans, but also seeks to change the international rules that govern peaceful and military nuclear programs in the direction it deems appropriate, knowing that these rules were reached, after the proliferation of nuclear weapons and during the cold war, in order to curtail the dangers of the possibility of such weapons being used once again in the world, and to keep them within the framework of mutual deterrence between the countries that developed them. In other words, the possibility of making fundamental changes to these rules, as per Iran's wishes, is confronted first to the stances taken by the countries that show flexibility in negotiating the Iranian issue (mainly China and Russia), before meeting with rejection from the Western countries that seek to impose sanctions against Tehran. Similarly, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declaring “haram” (prohibited by Islam) the use of nuclear weapons is not sufficient to convince the world of the peaceful nature of his country's program. Indeed, obscurity in the nuclear issue here acts against Iran's interest, if it truly seeks peaceful energy. It is true that Israel makes use of its own “nuclear obscurity” and considers that such obscurity is what provides it with its ability for strategic deterrence. Yet Iran's situation, as Iranian officials say, is different. Indeed, the Hebrew state has held nuclear weapons since the 1950s, it neither denies nor confirms, and it is not a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with the aim of first feeding such obscurity, and also of not being subject to international supervision. As for Iran, which is a member of the IAEA and declares its purpose to be not weapons but rather peaceful energy, it is behaving like a country that has obtained or is in the process of obtaining nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Iran cannot, at a time when it seeks to improve its regional situation, isolate the obscurity surrounding its nuclear intentions from its relations with neighboring countries. And the more such nuclear obscurity increases, the more suspicions increase over Iran's role, thus increasing tension with the neighboring region, in both its Arab and Turkish aspects. Today, as Moscow draws nearer to the Western stance on the Iranian issue and as China begins to negotiate the possibility of new sanctions, the margin of political maneuvering available to Tehran in this respect grows tighter. And it feels this in a way that makes it head towards suggesting new international rules. Does this then mean that it is preparing to permanently depart from such rules, or is this yet another maneuver to improve the conditions of negotiations?
