President Omar Al-Bashir is headed towards renewing his term in office, regardless of what the stances of the northern opposition will lead to – after the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) which is preparing to rule the South has made its decision regarding the fate of the government in Khartoum – and regardless of the political and electoral maneuvers adopted by the parties of this opposition, and their conditions for full or partial participation in these elections, which will determine the President and the members of the central parliament, as well as regional authorities. In such an easy win for him at these elections, Bashir is not relying on a positive sum of achievements. In fact, Sudan has witnessed under his rule the worst crises it has been through in its modern history, this in the record of human rights and liberties, in economic affairs, as well as in the relationship between the center and the provinces, especially in the North. In spite of such a negative résumé, especially in managing the problem of Darfur, which led to his being accused at the International Criminal Court (ICC) of crimes against humanity, exceptional enthusiasm can be noted, from the West in general and from the United States in particular, for holding the elections at their scheduled date and reelecting Bashir for a second term, knowing that it was this same West that was most enthusiastic about Bashir appearing before the ICC and being tried for the crimes ascribed to him. Opposite all these negative aspects ascribed to Bashir and his rule, there is one positive aspect over which specialists and observers agree, namely his managing the Naivasha Agreement with the SPLM in 2005, by virtue of which a referendum over the future of the South will be held next year. Indeed, in managing the disagreements with the SPLM, which has now become a partner in the central government, in addition to ruling the South, Bashir showed unprecedented flexibility and resilience, exerted efforts and gave the Southerners concessions in order to save the agreement, which has been through difficult phases since it was ratified. Even the armed confrontations that erupted several times between Southerners and Northerners in the region of Abyei, which was the object of conflict before the verdict of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), have been contained through a decision by the central government. Based on the discouraging experience of shared rule and the SPLM's independent behavior, it seems that the results of the referendum to determine the fate of the South are almost certainly headed towards secession. Even Bashir himself has declared on several occasions that he would support the results of this referendum, including secession, yet without adopting a policy that would make unity a factor of attraction for Southerners. This is where resides the importance of the presidential and legislative elections scheduled in a few days. Indeed, they are the necessary pathway for holding the Southern referendum, and their victor should commit to the results of this referendum. As it seems, there is no better candidate than the current President to provide these conditions in both their negative (in making unity attractive) and positive (in committing to the results of the referendum) aspects. Here lies the source of Bashir's strength in confronting those who oppose him in the North, not in the accusations they raise over democracy, freedom, diversity, mismanagement and distribution of resources, nor in the failure to resolve the Darfur issue, which is the most bloody at the moment. With respect to the fundamental problem of Bashir's rule, and what it has led to in terms of broad Northern opposition movements emerging, it lies in the predicament of adopting political Islam as a slogan of rule. This is the slogan that led to his quarrel, first, with Hassan Al-Turabi, who had been his ally in the military coup that toppled the democratically elected regime and established the rule of political Islam in Sudan, on the one hand; and on the other, to targeting the most popular Sudanese leaders, describing them as traditionalists, without taking into consideration their religious standing, especially within the Ansar and Khatmiyya sects. This has made the government resort, in order to keep a grip on power, to the security apparatus and to their supporters gathered in the National Congress Party (NCP), and reject at the same time any attempt to broaden the circle of representation in power. And this is the predicament of the coming elections: the need for Bashir means excluding any influence for those who call for unity in the central government.
