Is Iraq heading towards more “Lebanonization” after the elections? Just as the Arab Sunnis benefit from their participation in the parliamentary elections instead of boycotting these elections and pursuing violence, their representation in power after the elections is one of the major problems. This reality is not altered by their choice to join the Iraqi Coalition headed by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, while the latter's chances do not seem promising in the coming elections too, in a way that allows him to win the second rank in the elections. The “State of Law Coalition” headed by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, which scored a surprise in Baghdad as it obtained more seats there than in the southern provinces, is ahead of a difficult mission to convince Al-Maliki to relinquish the premiership for another figure from the coalition… This is only if certain indications are true, ones pointing to Washington's desire to support new figures and push them to the forefront during the period of the US forces' pullout. Will we witness more “Lebanonization” [attempts] and quotas?... This issue is raised again with the early start of the presidential and premiership battle, before announcing the final results of the elections, ones that proved in any case the keenness of the Iraqi forces and parties on continuing the political march and their refusal to succumb to terrorism manifested by explosions and random killing. The “Lebanonization” of Iraq inaugurates a chapter of the conflicts, one that will face everyone for many considerations, namely Al-Maliki's insistence on continuing his project which the southerners preferred over the platforms of other Shiite parties, particularly the Higher Islamic Council. Informed sources within the government in Baghdad almost affirm that Al-Maliki's abandonment of the premiership is more like “an impossible surprise.” His demand of the position could be presumed a “reward” for what he considers his success in running the government, not only “extracting a right” justified by the ballot results. This does not contradict with the fact that neither party could unilaterally form the government. What cannot be overlooked is that the “State of Law Coalition,” just like “Kurdistan Alliance” is ready for a swap: Putting pressures to reelect President Jalal Talibani for another term, in return for putting Kurdish pressures to nominate Al-Maliki once again for the “Civil State” Government. Thus, it is a mutual need, [hindered] by the “obstacle” of the Sunni Arabs, and the Shiite parties that are affiliated with the “Higher Islamic Council.” The Arabs seek to reap the results of their complete participation in the political process, and are looking forward to succeeding Talibani, considering that the presidential position restores a “guarantee” – even though a nominal one – in facing the dominance of the Shiite prime minister over power. The forces allied with the council are likely tending to “punish” Al-Maliki after he seized a great deal of their publicity in the southern provinces. These forces will thus view the insistence on an alternative Shiite figure to lead the government to be a legitimate demand. Assuming that it is impossible for Al-Maliki to relinquish the premiership is exactly what explains the Americans' belief that Baghdad is ahead of a political crisis that might be prolonged for months, thus keeping the doors open for the possibilities of security collapses that lie in wait for everyone. Sources who closely followed up on the elections from Iraq consider that the decisive battle took place in Baghdad, and that this battle will make the head of the “State of Law Coalition” further adherent to the premiership, while “rumors” went as far as to say that Al-Maliki seized around 40 seats out of the capital's overall 68 seats in the parliament. While the other surprise is represented by the advancement of Allawi who is superior in Kirkuk, to divide its seats with the “Kurdistani” bloc, in addition to his advancement in the Sunni stronghold provinces, this “victory” does not cancel the scenario of Allawi heading the camp of the new opposition and the possibilities of divisions in some blocs under the influence of counter demands and aspirations. Aside from the Iraqi provinces, it is legitimate to ask: Who voted for whom at the regional level?... But the talk about a division of power between the Arabs and Iran in Mesopotamia goes beyond excessive optimism, since Tehran does not usually abandon any of its “arenas,” so what if this arena is the size of Iraq and has its location and wealth? Ankara is perhaps not upset at all with choosing an Arab president for this country, so as to be reassured that the track of interests with Baghdad will not remain restricted to the channel of Kurdistan, which flourishes with privileges and oil wealth, as well as the aspirations of the “sleeper state” for the Kurds: A president from them for the province, and a president from them for all of Iraq, and an inclination to even swap the card of Kirkuk temporarily for keeping Talibani in the Presidential Palace in Baghdad. So it is a combination of “Lebanonization” and “Iraqization” which was developed by the Shiites and the Kurds, which enabled Al-Maliki to withstand at home despite all the fierce crises with neighboring Arab countries. The Arab Sunnis wish Iraq would return to its “Arab lap.” But between Al-Maliki and the “Higher Islamic Council,” whom will the “Iranian lap” remain for?
