AFTER his list for a proposed cabinet failed to gain the support of the legislature, Mustafa Abushagur lost his job earlier this month. In Bani Walid, regional divisions – rooted in tensions over the town's support for Muammar Gaddafi – have now turned violent. Last week, more than 100 prisoners escaped from one of Tripoli's biggest jails (although half have been caught, apparently). This is on top of the killing of the US ambassador, Christopher Stevens, and his three colleagues last month in the city of Benghazi. While Libya appears to be fighting an uphill battle without much hope of a positive resolution, all is not lost – at least not yet. A new prime minister has been chosen. As for the security questions raised by Stevens's death, the fact that thousands made clear their opposition to the attack is reassuring in and of itself. And while the dispute in Bani Walid shows no sign of letting up, it remains a symptom of a larger problem. During the war, arms from dozens of storage facilities – Gaddafi spent billions on weapons during his four decades in power – were raided by rebels. Combined with those sent by Qatar, there are now more than 20 million handguns, machine guns and assault rifles in existence and these remain outside the government's control. Some of the weapons are held by ordinary Libyans worried about their security and uninterested in relying on a weak police force. The majority of the arms, however, are held by the hundreds of militia groups dotting the country. Former rebels, the militias and their leaders are using these weapons to protect a variety of interests. Some simply want to make sure their communities are safe, while others are motivated either by a desire for revenge against Gaddafi loyalists (such as those living in Bani Walid) or their need to promote a violent understanding of Islam (as is true for those who killed ambassador Stevens). Then there are those who want to line their pockets by controlling the flow of illicit trade – drugs, gasoline and migrants fleeing for Europe – along the border areas. Dealing with the militias and their weapons is the most important challenge confronting the authorities. If these groups are allowed to continue operating outside of state control then there will be little hope that the rule of law – in which one body of law applies to rulers and ruled alike – will be achieved. In fact, if the current situation persists, there is a real danger that Libya could soon go the way of Somalia, where unaccountable warlords have ruled at whim and for their own benefit in a conflict that has raged since 1991. It is not as if Libyans are not trying to address the problem. In late September, they were encouraged to hand in their weapons to the army – which remains very weak – after a television ad campaign was launched to promote the idea. More than one thousand people responded, returning guns, ammunition, rocket and missile launchers, landmines and even tanks. They did so, at least in part, because of the rewards that were promised – iPads and flat screen televisions – but also because there is a genuine recognition that a lasting peace will not be achieved if the weapons problem is not dealt with. All of this is a start and has the potential to generate momentum for a more serious weapons collection effort. But if real progress is to be made, the militias have to participate. So far – and for the most part – they have not. How can they be convinced? Forget about iPads – this is a marketing ploy (and a good one, at least if the aim is to generate attention). A more serious option that Libyan policymakers will probably consider – if only because it has been used elsewhere – will be to pay militia fighters to exchange their guns. This will have immediate results but is ultimately a recipe for disaster. For one thing, by giving money to hundreds of thousands of people – the total number of militia fighters hovers around this figure – so-called “weapons buy-back” initiatives lead to a massive rise in inflation. More importantly, what will happen when the money runs out? In Liberia, where a civil war raged until 2003, fighters were given $300 to hand in their weapons. The result was that most of those who took the money quickly returned to violence when it became clear that employment opportunities were lacking. What is far more promising is an approach that allows the economy to foster peace. Rather than forcibly disarming the militias – as seems to be the preferred policy of the Libyan state – a more promising alternative is to give militia fighters real incentives that have the potential to secure their future. Part of this might include programs that distribute basics such as hoes, seeds, sewing machines, bicycles and household goods not only to militia members but their families. In return, weapons would be exchanged. This was used in the 1990s in Mozambique following its civil war and the results were impressive – thousands of weapons and ammunition supplies were returned. Instead, incentives can be used here too and the example of Mali is a possible model. Although violence has returned to that country, a disarmament program in the mid-1990s helped limit the number of weapons in circulation. In return for abandoning their arms, fighters were given $200 to start their own businesses. In other cases, they were provided with small loans for the same purpose.Using a similar policy to entice Libyan militia leaders to give up their position and convince their fighters to do the same might also prove fruitful. Extending the idea so that it also applies to individual fighters is another option worth thinking about. None of this will be easy and will certainly take time – perhaps a decade or longer. It is also likely to be expensive (although the weapons collections program in Mozambique and ones like it have cost less than $10 million). Yet, if the international community is serious about helping Libya's transition move forward, it will resist the urge to leave everything in the hands of a state that lacks the resources needed to put a targeted weapons policy in place. Failing to change course will only ensure that Libya becomes a warlord fiefdom – maybe even a terrorist haven – that threatens to destabilize the entire region and the world at large.
—Peter Fragiskatos teaches at Western University in London, Canada. Follow him on Twitter: @pfragiskatos
