Some Iraqi politicians attribute the escalation of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki against Syria to electoral reasons and internal conflicts among the Shiite parties. When it comes to the elections, Al-Maliki, who linked the explosions of the "Bloody Wednesday" with the "takfiri-Baathist alliance", was able to affirm to his Shiite opponents who are against Al-Baath and the Sunnis that he is hostile to this “alliance” more than any other party, after he was accused that he opened up to them through returning Baathists to their jobs in the state and through the "Awakening Councils". News, which was more like rumors, spread that they assumed critical security positions and participated in coordination with the Baathist leaders in Syria in facilitating the attacks on the state institutions. In order for his approaches to gain credibility, Al-Maliki submitted the confessions of one of "Al-Qaeda" leaders who said he was trained in Syria as evidence on the coalition involvement. These confessions did not convince anyone but those surrounding him, for many reasons, as the Iraqi investigators are not known for their independence from the authority, neither under the previous regime nor today. Among these reasons also is that corruption is rampant in all state institutions, and that the judiciary is no exception to this. Some Iraqis Shiites from Al-Maliki opponents, namely among the circles of the "coalition" and the "Supreme Council", assert that Al-Maliki's escalation is due to the elections. They say that the issue of the Syrian interference in the Iraqi affairs is not new and is justified for various reasons. They further note that just as Iraq is concerned about its security and regime, Syria is also concerned about its security and stability, and US threats are still directed to it, although these threats were downplayed under the new administration. They add that Al-Maliki could have addressed this issue with the Syrian authorities by diplomatic means and dialogue (the statements of Al-Maliki's opponents Abd al-Mahdi), aside from the media, if his aim had not been to attract Shiite voters that are against Al-Baath and the Sunnis. This analysis is supported by the Shiite demonstrations in Al-Hulla yesterday, which raised slogans against Syria, the Baathists, and President Bashar al-Asad. These demonstrations were more like an electoral or independent announcement, as though Syria was occupying Iraq. But even if this analysis were true, an important question remains: What about the American and Iranian stands on this issue? It was remarkable that Al-Maliki's escalation came at a time when the US momentum to restore the relations with Syria to normal decreased. No one believes that the US could not have dissuaded him from his move, but its position ranged between encouraging and calling for calm and "diplomatic dialogue", taking into account the fact that it is paving the way for the pullout of its army from Iraq and needs the Syrian cooperation. But at the same time, it still believes that time is not yet ripe to lift the pressures off Damascus which seemed at some point to have achieved all what it wants without making any concession in return. While this explains the American stand to some extent, what about Tehran's stand, whose mediation between its two allies was marred by much apathy? The Iranian-Syrian alliance rests on interests and is not free of contradictions, just like any other alliance. In Iraq, both sides meet on the position vis-à-vis the American occupation. But they disagree over the vision on Iraq's future. Tehran wants it to be an extension for its hegemony in the region, through a regime that supports it. It seeks to consolidate the sectarian quota system as it is. Damascus, at least through its slogans, wants an Arab Iraq that does not pose a threat to it and to its social fabric. Will the American pullout speed up the transformation of the contradictions between both allies into a conflict? What about their alliance and allies in Lebanon and Palestine?
