It would be better for Moroccan Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane to approach the opposition factions and request their accession to his government based on a minimum level of concord and understanding, than to let them consider whichever available means to topple his executive power. As much as he is aware of the fact that not wooing at least one opposition party to complete the quorum of the parliamentary majority would jeopardize his government, he knows that his government could be sustained through a restoration process that would rebuild the faltering walls, considering that nothing can end his mandate except a request to withdraw confidence or his resignation, both of which are off the table for now. The rising Moroccan Rebel movement might be provoking uprisings and discussions. However, experience has shown that the partisan dignitaries – in the opposition and loyalist teams alike – do not want vacuum or seeing the situation growing out of their control. However, no matter how much the conflict between the opposition and the loyalists were to escalate, the partisan elite is mobilized by one obsession, i.e. the fact that losing their grip over the political scene does not serve the interests of whichever side. Consequently, their fighting does not amount to the level of severance, which could cause the street to lose trust in all the parties. This is why there appears to be special normalization between the opposition and the majority, by which each side can bail the other out. According to dire extrapolations, the conflict between the opposition and loyalist teams does not extend beyond the Cabinet. Indeed, it might tend towards the highest levels of escalation and the use of all possible tools, but it never exceeds the counting of the governmental mistakes and the attempts to topple it, or to twist its arms. In addition, regardless of whether or not the government is democratically-conscious, the limits of the oppression it practices against the opposition remain governed by the minimum level of respect towards the requirements of its existence. Thanks to this equation, Morocco was able to avoid the repercussions of the Arab spring by distancing the state – that has a perpetual character – from changeable governments, and it was helped in that by the lessons it drew from the experiences of other states in eradication and exclusion wars. Before the dawn of the Islamic movements that rose at the expense of the crowds on the streets, Morocco encouraged normalization with those among them that enjoyed moderate tendencies. What helped is that the latter movements had emerged before the Arab action, and Morocco opened up to them, knowing that discussions are still ongoing over the chances of seeing the participation of the banned Justice and Charity group in the partisan and political scene in case the concessions were to meet halfway. Hence, when the Justice and Development Party came ahead in the legislative elections to lead the government they entailed, this did not come as a surprise to the Moroccans who went through a smooth normalization process, which left no room for any concerns, except to the extent to which the practices shift away from the rational management of public affairs. On the other hand, this was due to the effects of political practice. Indeed, although the political plurality recognized by the first Moroccan constitution in 1962 was lacking and almost imposed the hegemony of one loyalist movement over the other factions of national action, the gradual enhancement of democratic consciousness helped establish a structural framework, the development and openness of which were left to fill. This structure is the constitutional reference that is used to settle the various conflicts. And although the Moroccans do not argue about the ways to fill a constitutional vacuum that does not exist –despite all the crises and the political and social tensions known throughout the history of modern political conflicts – the ratification of the constitutions was done through rejection, boycotting or support. This tradition probably allowed the Moroccan experience to take another turn, considering that its spring is not like the others', and that its autumn is not always yellow and withering, seeing how it could be an autumn for a government, but not the end of a state. In that sense, the fall or collapse of any government becomes a mere passing event, because it is not linked to the collapse of a tendency or the end of a movement, rather to chemical equations in which many parties are involved. And the fact that no party can enjoy an absolute majority explains why some factors appear exceptionally important. Hence, the need to include other leaders pushes ones to believe that governments can be targeted by their opponents, but that the parties themselves are off limits.
