The Geneva 2 conference cannot be perceived as a crucial stop along the way to find a political settlement in Syria, considering that none of the concerned parties has so far shown the least bit of optimism towards its expected results, neither before nor after its staging. This is not due to the fact that the crisis is impossible to solve, but because what is happening on the field – in terms of fighting, division, cleansing and scorched earth policies – is drawing a new map for the country and going beyond the goals which the conference aims to achieve. It is also due to the fact that the country has turned into a place of pilgrimage for all types of Jihadist movements, and that the fighting parties on the domestic arena – even if they choose their representatives to the negotiations or dialogue table – will head to it under two slogans. On one hand, the opposition wants the heralding of President Bashar al-Assad's and his regime's departure and is demanding a ceasefire, while the president, his team and his domestic and external allies are active on the field to confirm their ability to settle the situation and consequently to uphold the regime. In addition, the foreign supporters of both sides are the ones talking on their behalf and setting their agendas and required positions. In other words, Iran is deciding and insisting on the stay of its ally, and the opposition's “friends" are drowning it with a series of steps and demands. Hence, the crisis seems impossible to solve because what is happening is no longer limited to the wishes or decision-making ability of the parties fighting on the internal scene. The settlement has become part of greater ones that await numerous events and tests. In addition, the crisis is no longer about the two main forces, i.e. the United States and Russia solely, as the dispute over the regional powers invited to participate in Geneva simply reveals there are other parties that should agree among each other first not only over the Syrian crisis, but also over many other pending files in the region. In other words, the international conference that could mark the beginning of an understanding between Washington and Moscow should also mark the beginning of a similar understanding between the influential regional powers, namely Turkey, Iran, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Arab countries. But this is not revealed by the current events, so as not to talk about the absence of understanding between America and the Islamic Republic, which is putting all its political and military weight behind President Al-Assad, Nouri al-Maliki's government, and Hezbollah, or about Israel's position and its stand vis-à-vis the future of the situation. There is nothing new about the fact that the regime is preparing for the international conference by seeking victories on the ground in Al-Quseir and other regions, in order to alter the balance of powers and topple the idea of change or peaceful transition of the authority. For its part, the opposition is caught between two fires and pressures that are difficult to overcome. Its friends are asking it to stop talking about the Syrian president's departure before Geneva 2 so that it is not held responsible for its failure or its non-staging. At this level, not one among them seems capable of giving it guarantees in advance regarding this departure, which is why some – or most of them – are settling for saying that President Al-Assad had no role to play in Syria's future. On the other hand, the fighters on the domestic arena are refusing to head to the negotiations without such guarantees, knowing that none of those involved in the negotiations have any influence over the extremist and active groups that are rejecting dialogues and settlements, and that converge with the regime in believing that the military resolution is underway, no matter how long the fighting continues! Hence, the opposition is facing a decisive challenge, i.e. not to be responsible for the undermining of the conference, in addition to other old and renewed challenges related to the organization of its ranks to convince its friends before any other party of its ability to manage the conflict with a unified political and military decision. For its part, the Coalition in Istanbul is nowadays facing a series of tasks. It was able to expand its ranks by including more democratic and liberal powers and independent figures in order to establish some sort of balance with the Muslim Brotherhood which currently enjoys the majority in. Nonetheless, it must select a new president and command, annul the government headed by Ghassan Hitto, agree over the dispatch of its representatives to the Geneva Conference, and adopt the required positions in it. But the Syrians are not the only ones busy preparing for the conference, as it has become the main preoccupation of most of the other concerned parties that are feeling their way through as if they were walking in the dark. The two most enthusiastic foreign ministers are American Secretary of State John Kerry and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov, who are meeting in Paris today to read into the latest positions and place touches which will not be the final ones. The European foreign ministers are also meeting in Luxembourg today to discuss the sanctions on Syria, in the presence of a British-French position calling for the lifting of the ban imposed on the dispatch of arms to the opposition. It has become clear that those seeking the opposition's arming want a fast decision going in that direction, in order to hasten the opposition's unification and the organization of its ranks, while threatening the regime to push it to take the conference seriously. At the same time, they want to use this card in the face of Damascus' allies, especially Russia, if Geneva 2 were to fail. Naturally, the Free Army hopes to be provided with weapons before sitting around the table, as it might be able to change the balance of powers and consequently alter the political results and the shape of the transitional phase. At this level many fear that the regime's or Hezbollah's control over the city of Al-Quseir will obstruct the conference and maybe even eliminate any chance to reach a political settlement in the future. Despite these facts, one can say that Washington and Russia have paved the way towards Geneva to the beat of the Russian conditions, which confused the Syrian opposition and its Arab and European friends, and has shaken – and is still shaking – their ranks. True, President Barack Obama does not want Syria's collapse as much as he wants a political settlement. In addition, he does not want to see it facing the fate of countries which have already been swept by the Arab spring. But what is also true is that he wishes to cross a long path leading towards an understanding with Kremlin, exceeding the Middle East and reaching the Iranian nuclear file, the Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and China Sea issues and other known files. The theory related to the depletion policy adopted towards the Syrian regime, Iran, Hezbollah, and the extremist Sunni powers has been excessively used. However, the American administration benefited from it, whether it has adopted it as a clear policy, or was provided with this service by its miscalculated expectations regarding the fast fall of Al-Assad's regime, as it was seen in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. But the continuation of the war in Syria and the slide of many regional powers into this quagmire has started to threaten its interests in the region, and it is no secret that Congress, and not just the Republicans, has started to exert pressures on President Barack Obama's administration through the partners and allies, in order to hasten the departure of Al-Assad's regime. According to sources connected to the National Security Council, the latter Council is now warning the administration against seeing the American interests truly threatened. But the question remains: When will the president intervene and how will he determine the shape of this intervention? This will definitely not be done before his summit with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. He will wait to see how Geneva 2 will go before introducing any amendment to his policy, but also the results of the presidential elections in Iran. The latter is not expected to change its policy as long as it has limited the competition to the conservative candidates. Hence, while seeking a settlement to stop the war in Syria, or at least maintain the minimum level of control over the management of the crisis, Obama's administration is trying to appease the arenas moving along the beat of that war. At this level, it was temporarily able to push Kurdistan to agree with Baghdad, in the hope of appeasing the enthusiasm of the Sunni provinces to lower the ceiling of their demands and push them to reassess their calculations and power on the ground. But this is merely a frail truce. Indeed, after Iran allowed itself and Hezbollah to head to Syria to defend the rejectionism and resistance axis, it is pushing its Arab opponents, especially among the Gulf countries, to practice that same “licensing" in defending Nouri al-Maliki's and his government's opponents in Al-Anbar and its sisters. And both licenses are fueling sectarian tensions in the region. The administration is also exerting pressures on the Lebanese government and the sides involved in the conflict to hold the elections and not postpone them, and to form a new government. Today, a session was held by the resigned Cabinet to form a committee to overlook the parliamentary elections and adopt the necessary measures to hold them based on the law in force, i.e. the 1960 law. Perhaps this, along with the rush of the partisan and political leaders and the aspirants to register their candidacies, portends the exclusion of the current parliament's term extension. And if this miracle occurs, it would also be a temporary truce until the Al-Quseir war moves to North Lebanon and elsewhere, at a time when it is no secret that Lebanon is living to the beat of Hezbollah's implication in the Syrian war and its domestic repercussions. And while its role is understandable in light of its position in the rejectionism axis and what the Syrian bridge means for its future, the call made by its Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah to his Lebanese detractors to distance their country and meet him on the Syrian arena, does not conceal the fears of some Lebanese circles over the undermining of the demographic structure and accurate balance of the sects and denominations, due to the large numbers of Syrian refugees entering the country and the shifting of the mood within the Palestinian camps. The latter also do not exclude the possible move of the Al-Quseir war to the North under the pretext of defending Jabal Mehsen and its people, while Tripoli and the North in general will not take a lot of time to summon help! Did the border of the French mandate over Syria before the establishment of Greater Lebanon not include Tripoli, Homs, Aleppo and Mosul, which also used to be a permanent point of dispute between the Ottomans and the Safavids? The only fast solution to end the war in Syria and prevent its spread throughout the region is through the agreement of the international and regional sides over a settlement accepted by all of them, so that they are able to impose it on the warring parties by force. If this is not done, anarchy will prevail and the truce in Iraq and Lebanon will collapse. And so far, one can only see the smoke of the fires.
