Syrian opposition member and National Coordination Committee (NCC) spokesperson abroad Haytham Manna listed the obstacles to the unification of Syrian opposition movements as follows: First: the persistence of the notion of the single leading party (which leads state and society as per the text of the old constitution, or what is known as Article 8). Second: the independence of political decision-making. It has quickly become apparent that there were international and regional parties making sure to interfere in the affairs of the opposition. Indeed, the demands made by Turkey with regard to the Turkish issue from the Syrian National Council (SNC), the National Coordination Committee (NCC) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) are known to all, near and far. Third: the absence of intermediary forms for coordinating and finding common ground... No seminars have been organized to discuss core issues such as the features of the transitional period, the economic sanctions imposed, the constitution required, or the need for supra-constitutional principles... Fourth: the banning of the notion of minimal communication, i.e. the presence of a permanent emergency committee... Manna listed these points little over eight months ago, when the prevalent concern had been that of unifying the opposition so that it may move forward, and with it its international and regional backers, with a single program for toppling the regime and setting up an alternative to it. Yet since then, disagreements have increased among the ranks of the opposition, as well as among those of its allies. Some insisted on duplicating the Libyan model. Others preferred the Yemeni model. Others still sought after a coup from within the regime or wagered on broad defections from the army. And it was only natural for such disagreements to reflect on the opposition's performance, both politically and militarily, especially after the element of Islamic extremists was introduced to the equation – extremists who, amid such chaos, have become the strongest or the deciding party on the field. And it is no longer in anyone's ability to impose any program on them except their own, based on eliminating others even if they are allies. Announcing the formation of the National Coalition under the leadership of Ahmad Moaz Al-Khatib had been the last attempt to gather the fragmented opposition, when the Syrian National Council (SNC), with all of its contradictions, was forced to join it. Yet Khatib's initiative to engage in dialogue with the regime has come to expose such contradiction and consecrate the deep-rooted disagreements that exist between those forced to form this coalition. Indeed, they have all reached a dead-end – neither are they able to seriously form an alliance, nor are they able to declare their failure and go their separate ways, as there are numerous factors preventing them from doing this, most prominently their fear of losing political and financial, not to mention military, support. The Islamic Summit in Cairo has come to consecrate this state of inability to cause any kind of breakthrough in the issue of Syria. Indeed, the summit's closing statement took a consensual form between those who call for military intervention and for toppling the regime through force and those who support this regime. The statement did not mention Assad by name and called for talks between the National Coalition and “representatives of the Syrian Government committed to political transformation in Syria and who have not been directly involved in any form of oppression". Although a consensual one, this statement represents a qualitative shift in the view of those participating in the summit on reaching a settlement. Indeed, they have avoided calls for arming the opposition and toppling the regime through force, considering dialogue to represent the basis for any solution. Yet dialogue requires certain conditions that have not yet matured. One such condition is that of mutual concessions between the two sides, which is not an option so far. Indeed, disagreement over the transitional government and the powers it would hold represents the greatest obstacle to any dialogue. This is in addition to the fact that the Syrian National Council has rejected Khatib's initiative and the direction he is taking. Indeed, the SNC is still waiting for support with advanced weapons that would reverse the balance of power on the field and topple the regime. It has not taken into account the fact that Turkey has backed down months ago on establishing a buffer zone, or the fact that Jordan has refused to turn its border into a base for any kind of military action. Nor has it accounted for the Al-Nusra Front entering the confrontation, or for the daily killing and destruction. And ahead of all of this, it does not want to admit to its own inability to unite its ranks in order to form a driving force that would impose its vision on everyone. At one stage or another of the ongoing massacre, the Syrian National Council, and after it the National Coalition, won the whole world, but lost itself and lost Syria. And the obstacles to unifying the opposition which Manna spoke of are still standing to this day. The Syrian opposition is disconnected from reality, and perhaps Khatib's initiative and the statement of the Islamic Summit represent the first realistic step to have been taken.
