As the military and political predicament of the regime in Syria increases, so too rises the Iranian voice declaring the oneness of the battle being waged by the regime in Damascus – a rising voice that finds its echo in Lebanon through Hezbollah. There is no doubt about the nature of the vital relationship between the two regimes in Damascus and in Tehran, the latter having invested billions of dollars and a great deal of effort in Syria and in Hezbollah in order to spread the network of its strategic interests to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. With the Syrian regime's predicament increasing, as a result of its blood-spattered strategy and of it sealing off all solutions, Tehran finds its strategic interests to also be threatened. And what is Iran's verbal escalation but a message to say that it demands to be present in any later arrangements concerning Syria's future? Indeed, the regime in Damascus is inevitably headed towards its fall, whether it comes sooner or later. Tehran is aware of this conclusion and is working on its basis, along with Hezbollah, its arm in Lebanon. Such a conclusion places Hezbollah before a major dilemma, which it so far does not seem to be in the process of reconsidering its stances and its ideology in order to overcome. This dilemma is connected to the circumstances under which Hezbollah was founded, and the function it was meant to have, within both the regional and the Lebanese framework, as these circumstances and this function are on the verge of a major transformation. Hezbollah arose as a tool in the hands of Syria's management of its situation in Lebanon, on the basis of religious authority over part of Lebanon's Shiite community who followed the Vilayat-e-Faqih, with what this entails in terms of splitting away from Lebanese national identity. Syria's hegemony, along with Iran's investments, had protected such a split, in a manner that has become recognized even at the state level in Lebanon within the framework of what is referred to as “supporting the Resistance". Two important factors have newly entered this equation. The first is represented by the predicament faced by the Syrian regime, which is no longer able to even protect itself, not to mention “support the Resistance" in Lebanon. In fact, this equation is increasingly threatened with the widening social rift and rising confessional tension in Syria, which will inevitably reflect on the state of affairs of the Shiite community in Lebanon, whose former split away from Lebanese national identity is turning from an element of strength into one of weakness. In connection to the weakening influence of the Damascus regime, both in Syria and in Lebanon, Lebanese political forces have begun to gradually “liberate themselves" from the formula of “supporting the Resistance" and the policies connected to it. These forces are thus now demanding that Hezbollah's hegemony be lifted, not just when it comes to the government, but also to the Shiite community itself. Such “liberation" is becoming apparent in the behavior of the head of the Lebanese state, whether in terms of dealing with Syria's border violations or of decisions to confront the activity of armed groups in the area traditionally subjected to the direct influence of Hezbollah in terms of security – even if Hezbollah lifting its cover also means that it is feeling increasingly embarrassed with regard to its “encroachments" on the rights of the state. More important than all of this is the exclusion of the formula of “the army, the people and the resistance" from the defense strategy suggested by the President of the Republic, after it had been one of the main pillars of the policies and ministerial statements of several governments. This call for restoring the prerogative of deciding to make war and peace in Lebanon to the hands of the state has been met with broad support from participants at the National Dialogue Table – which means increasing Hezbollah's isolation on this issue, or at least placing it before the challenge of having to deal with such a change. Clearly Hezbollah's tone has not decreased regarding all of these issues, as it still maintains a radical stance in the media in terms of supporting the regime in Damascus and confronting the West and Israel, just as the regime in Tehran does. It is not unlikely for the same goals to be behind such escalation, namely those of preserving their standing under new circumstances, after the fall of the regime in Damascus. And if Tehran is maneuvering beyond its borders to preserve its interests, the interests of the Shiite community in Lebanon, whom Hezbollah considers itself to represent, remain within the borders of Lebanon – or rather, reside in returning to it by reconsidering the strategy of splitting away from Lebanese national identity and engaging with this identity once again, while separating the religious frame of reference from the national one.
