The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) did not have to wait for too long before responding to the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) nomination of Engineer Khairat AlShater for the presidency. General Omar Suleiman, former head of General Intelligence and Vice President under the Mubarak regime, thus threw his name into the presidential ring. Previously, SCAF had announced that it would not nominate a candidate of its own in the race. But it soon did, albeit stopping short from officially endorsing Suleiman, unlike what the MB did, as the group reneged on its previous promises and stances and nominated a member of the group for the presidential race. The picture is not yet complete, and will not be completed easily either. Things are getting ever more complicated, and many questions need clear answers. Furthermore, the recent nominations will prompt all Egyptian parties to reconsider their plans, and perhaps even their candidates as well as their liaisons and alliances. The fact that there are several candidates within the same camp in many instances does not undermine the Islamists alone, but also the liberals, the youths of the revolution, both the left and the center, as well as the silent majority, particularly away from the cities, squares and streets that embraced the uprising from day one. There are four candidates who enjoy support from the Islamists, about eight that represent the various specters of the liberal camp, and three from the nationalist and leftist camps. And in truth, Suleiman is not the only holdover from the previous regime, as Amr Moussa and Ahmed Shafik too are in the presidential fray. From the beginning, the MB has attempted to suggest that it is not after power. The group endeavored to move away from the Salafis, despite their agreement over the formation of the constitution committee. They also stated that they would not put forward a candidate for the presidency, in order to safeguard Egypt's international relations, and in order to reassure their partners at home. However, it seems that the SCAF's appeasement of the MB, and the smooth engagement undertaken by the United States and other international and regional forces with them, have reinforced their desire to seize all institutions, and to rush their march to power lest the conducive climate changes. It was not in their calculation that Suleiman's entry into the fray will push Washington and all other factions that avoided a clash with the MB to alter their stances and reposition themselves. In such a scenario, it will not be easy for the Islamist group to take on all these forces at once. The MB has rushed its onslaught against the institutions without any regard to others, both at home and abroad. They bet all their political currency that they harvested in the parliamentary elections on the presidential race. For this reason, the price of this race may be too great, whether they manage to put a president from their ranks in office or not, as it will not be easy for them to monopolize power. Indeed, they had not seized a majority in the elections, albeit they emerged with the biggest share of the vote. Half of the voters did not choose them, let alone those who did not vote at all. They ventured against SCAF, realizing that Egyptians after the revolution have broken the barrier of fear, and are therefore able to take to the streets at will. But the mobilization of the public, a threat being brandished by the MB, is a double-edged sword. Certainly, this weapon can well be used against them should they fail to provide what the silent majority wants in terms of security and stability, the revival of the economy – including its ramifications with international and regional funds and entities-, and restarting factories and plants-although they know that there are many hurdles to this both at home and abroad. The MB and other factions that put forward candidates should not have been surprised by the nomination of General Suleiman. His name started being circulated when the Islamist group expressed its desire to nominate one of its leaders, in breach of the promises and assurances it had hitherto made. Despite the divisions and disputes that plagued its ranks, the MB nominated AlShater, prompting a quick response that materialized with the nomination of Suleiman, the man who has been absent from the arena for more than a year, and has been distant from the trials and other measures taken against the figures of the former regime. Suleiman's candidature was mostly met with negative reactions. The MB posted his picture with Israeli officials on their Facebook pages, and reiterated what their statement on AlShater's candidature said with regard to real threats to the revolution, including “pushing one or more holdovers from the previous regimes as presidential candidates and supporting them through the remnants of the dissolved [ruling] party and the enemies of the revolution to attempt to regenerate the previous regime”. Meanwhile, Al-Wasat Party saw the candidature of President Mubarak's right hand man as “an announcement that the previous regime has come back”, while Amr Moussa said that this candidacy represents ‘an early failure'! Yet these stances may well change, at least on the eve of the second round of the elections, bearing in mind that the Islamists are not united, and do not all stand behind one candidate. Khairat AlShater pledged to the Salafis that Sharia remains and will always be his first and foremost goal and plan, and promised them that ‘a group of influential people will be put together to assist Parliament in achieving this goal'; this took place at a meeting between AlShater and the Sheikhs of the ‘Islamic Law Commission for Rights and Reform'. But this may not only stoke fears of an MB President in office, but may also raise the ire of the Al-Azhar sheikhs who stand on the other side in the confrontation with the Islamist group, and who see their doctrinal and national roles as a historical and universal Egyptian, Arab and Islamic authority matched by none. In addition, the fact that the Election Commission has denied the Salafis the chance to run their own candidate will prompt them to ‘reshuffle the deck', in light of the unspoken conflict between them and the MB, who see the Salafis as the ‘creation' of the previous regime aimed at challenging them within their own base. So by nominating AlShater, the MB wanted to thwart the Salafis and Dr. Abdul Moneim Aboul Fotouh, who was expelled by the MB and is widely popular among many Islamists and liberals. Even the MB, whose ranks became divided following the expulsion of Aboul Fotouh, did not agree on nominating the deputy of their supreme leader. AlShater obtained the ‘blessing' of the MB's ‘Shura Council' with a majority of two votes only. It is obvious then that the ‘Youths' of the Islamist group are valleys apart from the group's ‘Elders'. Yet this is nothing new. The MB suffered sharp polarization for a very long time, and even before the revolution from, between these two groups. During the revolution, the old guard tended towards reconciliation with the regime while the new generation wanted to participate in the protests. This split is still ongoing, especially in the manner the group deals with SCAF which the ‘Elders' are keen on appeasing and not being dragged into an open and explicit conflict with, given their painful and long history with the military for more than half a century. The Islamists know that the military enjoys special standing and prestige among the people and other broad segments which increasingly sense the need for a break amid shaky security, economic hardship, unemployment and the fear of the unknown. Suffice to say that the economic, industrial and agricultural sectors run by the military attract large segments of the workforce and support hundreds of thousands of families. This is not to mention the organizational capacity of the army throughout all military and security services, and the state institutions in general, based on a long history of building the elements of the modern Egyptian state, from the days of Muhammad Ali Pasha to the July 23 Revolution and up until the end of Mubarak's era. The Islamists are also aware that SCAF's candidate will not be the candidate of the military alone, but also that of international powers that do not want to see the MB monopolize all aspects of the state. He will also be the candidate of other regional powers, which were not pleased by the departure of the former regime in the manner that came to pass, and which are not keen on seeing Egypt restore its pioneering and leading role in the region under the banner of the Islamists. For this reason, the second round will prove to be crucial, where the voters will choose between two candidates only. Undoubtedly, one of the two will represent the Islamists and the other will be supported by the military first, and second by the factions affiliated to the former regime, and whose ability to mobilize supporters must not be underestimated. In addition, this candidate will be supported by the leftist and liberal factions who fear dominance by the MB and its allies, and will also be no doubt backed by foreign powers, especially the United States which would definitely prefer General Suleiman to take office, or any other consensus candidate agreed upon by the opponents of the MB on the eve of the second round of the elections. Finally, such a candidate will also be backed by certain Arab countries that find themselves apprehensive of the MB taking control of Egypt's reins, and what it means in the Arab and Islamic worlds. The MB is not only burning through stages in its policy of seeking power, but is also burning the ships, pushing for an open confrontation with the military and many other factions that represent important symbols for the Egyptian people. They rejected the offer by Recep Tayyip Erdogan to seek inspiration from the ‘Turkish model', and did not realize that the military does not hand over power easily. To be sure, it took the “Muslim Brotherhood of Turkey' decades of conflict with the military, and when they finally took power, the AKP by then was not something that resembled the MB in its beginnings. They changed a great deal in Turkey, and were not at all the same as the ‘old guard' any more. So will the MB of Egypt push the conflict towards a major battle that undermines the stability and unity of the country? As the presidential elections draw closer, the gap among the segments of society grows bigger and the divisions grow worse. So is what is required now a return to the public squares that pushes the country into a dangerous and devastating economic and social crisis, and tensions with nearby and faraway countries? Or is what required a return to the rules of the political game as dictated by the facts on the ground? The decisive battle is not very far. The military will not admit defeat, and will not accept for the constitution to be amended in a manner that undercuts their benefits, privileges and historical role. And as regards the Muslim Brotherhood, should the group be defeated, then this will mean that all it has hitherto built was sandcastles!
