It appears that the biggest worry for Russian diplomats, among other things, in their dealing with the bloody events underway in Syria via the Syria Council is a possible repeat of their experience with Libya. It has become clear that the Libyan example is Moscow's chief excuse in rejecting any United Nations resolution against the Syrian regime over its continued policy of oppression. The Russian leadership opposed seeing Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi step down when the uprising against him began on 17 February, and called for dialogue between him and the opposition. However, the unfolding of events in the North African country, and the Arab League's request for a no-fly zone against the regime's use of its aircraft to quell the uprising of the Libyan people, prompted Moscow to overlook the issuing of a Security Council resolution to impose such a no-fly zone. Russian diplomacy was disappointed after the issuing of the resolution, which was used to justify western aerial military intervention to support the rebels and bring down the Libyan regime. NATO warplanes went beyond the notion of protecting civilians, which was the official justification for the no-fly zone. Russia, thunderstruck, felt that it had been stabbed in the back because it was unable to convince western countries of its interpretation of the resolution, which would have been restricted to protecting civilians, and not helping the rebels against the Gaddafi regime in the ongoing conflict between the two sides. This prompted Russia's foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, to criticize the European interpretation of the resolution, but the result was confusion in Moscow about the developments in Libya. Russia was wary of the growth in western influence in an oil-rich country at the expense of its long-standing ties with the Libyan leadership; these ties have generated large-scale investment contracts for Russian companies. Russia fears the prospective loss of this investment climate in the event it is unable to keep up with the developments. This confusion turned into clumsiness and Moscow opened up to the Libyan rebels' National Transitional Council, but after the rebels' decisive jump in entering Tripoli, and Gaddafi's flight, Russian President Dimitri Medvedev has only called for dialogue between the rebels and the fugitive Libyan leader. Russia's clumsiness or confusion is a reflection of the struggle between two groups in Moscow. There is a generation of veteran Russian diplomats, at the Foreign Ministry and military leaders, at the Defense Ministry, who are keen to maintain good ties with the Soviet Union's former allies, and military contracts. Meanwhile, there is also a younger generation, which believes that the transformation in Russia over the last two-plus decades means that the country should follow up the Arab spring and Arabs' striving for democracy, so that the west alone does not reap the benefits of the transformation. For this latter group, some of the Syrian regime's claims of “foreign conspiracy” recall the rhetoric of the “comrades of the Soviet Union.” In terms of the higher Russian leadership, where decisions reflect a mix of input by the two generations, what guides ties with the west and the White House in the Security Council is always the price that should be obtained from Washington in terms of forcing it to abandon its missile shield in a number of Eastern European countries, which Moscow sees as a reduction of its power and influence and a return to American unilateralism after the rise of Russia following the disintegration of the USSR. Moscow shares with western countries a fear that events will move toward civil war in Syria; it also fears that the Muslim Brotherhood will dominate the Syrian uprising. Russia is fluctuating between openness toward the disunited Syrian opposition and informing the Syrian leadership that it can no longer tolerate this level of killing, despite the belief by Russian diplomats that “terrorists” are in the ranks of the protestors, as the Syrian regime is saying. Moscow is awaiting a prompt response to its demand for a halt to the military operations and the bloodbath, and the immediate embarking on reforms, before taking a decisive stance by either accepting a resolution condemning the violence in Syria, or turning a blind eye to any resolution imposing sanctions that avoid Syrian President Bashar Assad among the various Syrian officials and target future military contracts, and not past ones between Russia and Syria. However, this fluctuation will become the decisive aspect of its policy toward Syria for a period of time that might extend beyond the parliamentary elections in December, which will lead to presidential elections in March. As the wait continues, there are those in Moscow who might rely on Assad's telling former Lebanese Prime Minister Salim Hoss this week that “the painful events have ended,” to see Russian opposition win out vis-à-vis a Security Council resolution.
