A few days after the anniversary of last year's May 7 events in Beirut, and Hezbollah's attempt to make Beirut succumb by force to one political line, Hezbollah's candidate in Tyre, Nawaf al-Musawi, summed up his party's way of thinking as well as its relations with politics in general and its rivals in particular. He said that those who criticize the party's positions, strategy, concepts, its replacement of the State, the preeminence of its interests over the State's interests - and its attempts to impose itself as a partner to the State in security issues by the power of weapons and the fait accompli and as a non-Parliament observer of its performance and caretaker of its foreign policy - were actually completing the work of Israel which targets the resistance and its weapons. Commenting on the unveiled Israeli espionage networks in Lebanon, Al-Musawi addressed the authorities saying: "When you investigate with the Israeli agent and discover that his job is to spy on the resistance cadres to assassinate them, and on the locations of its weapons to explode them, and if this agent tells you that I am the ally of your ally because in your political rhetoric, you attack the resistance and its weapons, what would you tell him?" I asked: "What is the difference between attacking the weapons of the resistance and criticizing its political performance?" This is very clearly Hezbollah's concept of political action: the latter must either defend these weapons, putting itself at their disposal or is considered a treacherous enemy intent on covering up Israel's security action, thus necessitating an appropriate security response. Isn't this exactly what happened in this month last year when Hezbollah's militia took to the streets of the capital to "discipline" those who dared to criticize it? They destroyed and burned media outlets and killed civilians in the name of defending the resistance. Eliminating the difference between the "external" job of the resistance (facing the occupation) - which should be confined to specific time and geographical limits and should end once it achieves its goals - and between its relations with the internal front that embraces it and represents its political cover during the period of liberating the lands, is actually an attempt to extend its mission – after it ended - to include all of Lebanon without any restraints. Rooted in the totalitarian and fascist ideas to the effect that "he who does not support us, is against us," this argument sees no need for pluralism nor any benefit in diversity. Should we be surprised then that Hezbollah is promoting the idea of eliminating the borders between security and politics, while it embraces Iran and its political regime as a model and an example? There too, newspapers are shutdown and critics are imprisoned, while the opponents are beaten and isolated, prevented from expressing their opinions and discussing their choices. There too, the "valli-e faqih" [the supreme ruler] prevails, a ruler whose demands can not be rejected and his decisions can not be discussed, a ruler who can neither be criticized nor called to account. He sets standards for the people and institutions, asking for abidance without any complaint. Hence, we cannot but wonder: Will we soon discover among us a "guide" if the opposition wins the elections and monopolizes the decision-making process? While Hezbollah endeavors to silence any voice that disagrees with its policy, his ally Michel Aoun, on the contrary, considers silence as a conspiracy. He fiercely attacks those who remain silent on reports about his intentions if he wins the elections, accusing them of being partners to the conspiracy against him. He also calls on the press to play its assumed role in defending him and exposing the lies of his rivals. Therefore, he leaves the Lebanese people confused between remaining silent as Hezbollah wants, and speaking up as he asks them to do.
