In his television interview two days ago, Syrian President Bashar Assad tackled various directions. His comments demonstrated the old and well-known of these stances, but also contained new items. At the least, there was the tone he used to describe political transformations that have appeared in Syrian foreign policy for more than a year, to keep pace with Arab and international changes. Not the least of these new aspects in policy orientations is the Syrians' differentiation between the Barack Obama administration in the United States and the previous White House team. The Syrians were determined to deal extremely diplomatically with the statements by the new US ambassador to Syria, Steven Ford, when commenting on the latter's statements in testimony before Congress. There, Ford talked about disputes and conflicts between Washington and Damascus. The Syrian president has been looking forward to an improvement in relations with the Obama administration, which appears even more imminent with every round of dialogue between the two sides since Obama's election. It is clear that the Syrian leadership is wagering on a resumption of the relationship with the US, “the biggest power in the world to guarantee the peace process.” Another new item in policy, from Assad's remarks, involved stances such as insisting on the survival of the Arab Peace Initiative, and a revelation about the stance of Syria's chief ally, Iran. Assad commented that he did not hear “ even once from any official over three decades that they were against a peace” (with Israel), and affirmed that “if there is a problem with Iraq related to foreign powers (Iran's violation of national security in Iraq), it is first of all due to the Arabs' absence… we are absent, and we should step up and play a role in Iraq.” There might be innovation in Assad's tone toward Iraq and the Iranian role, which should be highlighted, in light of the Iraqi general elections, which produced new results, and after indications that the most topic of accord between Syria and Saudi Arabia, which has evolved step by step since a reconciliation at the end of 2008, is the achievement of true partnership in Iraq's political system, which limits Iran's influence and recovers the clout of the Arab role in the Iraqi domestic equation. It is obvious that the cooperation between Riyadh and Damascus on Iraq is a priority on the two countries' long agenda, in light of domestic and external political movement in the direction of filling the vacuum of a US withdrawal in 2011. If Iran has succeeded in filling the Arab vacuum, in the light of the US occupation in place, and while ethnic, sectarian and religious contradictions in Iraq grow larger, then the long-term Syrian interests of its relationship with a pivotal country and its huge capacities have imposed, in recent years, a contradiction with Iranian policy, under the ceiling of the alliance between Damascus and Iran. Clearly, Saudi-Syrian cooperation picked the opportune moment, which is summed up by domestic Iraqi discontent with America's management of the country's affairs and its division of influence with Iran, in addition to the latter's intervention in Iraqi domestic affairs, the gathering of Iraqi political groups opposed to sectarian conflict among the Shiites, and their alliance with Sunnis and others – all of these being factors that produced a new electoral result, so that the winner may play a role in creating a new partnership in the political system. This Iraqi “moment” allows Saudi-Syrian cooperation to achieve a change in the regional picture. This will allow Riyadh to see a limitation of Tehran's influence, which has been increasingly worrying, and serve as a test for how much Damascus can stand apart from its ally. This distance between Syria and Iran is in the interest of regaining Arab initiative, and proves that returning Syria to the Arab fold helps achieve benefits for the Arabs and removes their being described as part of the Iranian axis. Without deluding ourselves about the possibility of splitting Iran from Syria, the awaited post-election political settlement in Iraq resembles that produced by Lebanon's Doha Accord. It shall lead to a government of national unity, in which Iran and other regional powers divide shares of influence, instead of being the dominant factor. Iraq's political settlement will come as a result of cooperation between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Syria, with Ankara and Damascus taking on the task of “convincing” Iran of the plan. If the new in President Assad's comments appeared in his desire to work for multi-faceted partnership in Iraq, with other influential countries, then the old in the stances he announced two days ago was reflected in what he said about Lebanon, when he denied that opponents of Syrian policy in recent years had achieved their announced goals (a Syrian withdrawal, the exchange of ambassadors, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, etc.) If Damascus is moving toward some partnership with regional powers in Iraq, then its position on Lebanon paves the way toward abolishing partnership with these forces in Lebanon, exactly in the fashion it used to manage the country prior to 2005. Will regional powers, which sponsored or took part in the changes that have taken place in this small country, accept seeing their role eliminated, in exchange for Syria's partnership with them in Iraq? Most likely not, despite their determination to take Syria's interests in Lebanon into account in their calculations.
